[Media-watch] Reframing the Iraq Election

[Cem Ertur]

http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?SectionID=15&ItemID=7079



Reframing the Iraq Election
by Frank Brodhead; ZNet, January 21, 2005

Sharp criticisms have been made of the January 30th US-sponsored election in
Iraq. The criticism comes from a broad range of elite opinion, stretching from
Brent Scowcroft to The New York Times to the leadership of the Democratic
Party. Though it seems that the election is deeply flawed and is likely to do
more harm that good, President Bush is unshaken in his determination to press
on. Is this another case of the President refusing to admit a mistake? Or is
it that the Iraq election serves an altogether different purpose from that
presupposed by its critics?

According to both mainstream critics and many in the peace movement, Iraq's
election is being held too soon, before security conditions allow for a free
election. Candidates can't campaign freely (indeed, they are invisible).
Voters in many areas will risk their lives if they go to the polls. Important
and "moderate" Sunni leaders are asking that the elections be postponed, and
the possibility persists that major Sunni political groups will boycott the
election. Many details about the election mechanics also appear problematic.
And some critics argue that the election itself may spark a civil war between
Sunnis and Shi'ites, as it will inevitably lead to a Shi'ite-dominated
assembly and national administration.

These criticisms are important and true. But they are built on two unstated
assumptions that make them largely beside the point.

The first assumption is that a free election can be organized by an occupying
power. The illegitimacy of conducting an election by an occupying power is at
the core of the critique of the election by the antiwar movement and, indeed,
by much of the world. Though this principle is fundamental to elementary
principles of democracy, it is off the agenda for mainstream critics of the
election.

The second assumption is that the Iraqi election is part of a plan to
disengage the United States from Iraq. In this the mainstream critics mimic
the limited dissent towards the Iraq war voiced by the Kerry campaign: a
criticism of methods but not of ultimate goals. Yet there is no reason to
think that the United States intends to end its occupation of Iraq short of
the establishment of a regime prepared to accommodate the demands of the Bush
administration. Within the context of a strategy to subjugate Iraq to the
long-term needs of the United States, the Iraq election will serve an
essential purpose, but one quite different from that assumed within the
mainstream media and political debate.

Plans for a Long-term Occupation

The United States intends to make Iraq a client state. Control of Iraq's oil
is a strategic and economic prize that would be impossible for the
oil-dominated Bush administration to walk away from. We know now that the war
on Iraq was initiated on the basis of overall strategic goals that pre-dated
9/11 and had nothing to do with terrorism or WMD. The prospect of a network of
US military bases in Iraq -- perhaps as many as 14 bases -- would increase
many fold the ability of the United States to dominate the Middle East. The
privatization of Iraq's economy, the opening of Iraq to foreign (US)
investment, and the political importance of the company's benefiting from the
US reconstruction program in Iraq have already created a strong vested
interest in continued US domination. This long-term commitment has been
further clarified by the reconfiguration of the Bush team preparatory to its
second term, as dissenters from the Bush policies in Iraq have been removed.
In the past week President Bush claimed on several occasions that the outcome
of the November election amounted to a mandate for his Iraq policies; and
Seymour Hersh's article in the current New Yorker provides confirmation from
Washington insiders that the Bush team will push a very hard line in Iraq.

Moreover, President Bush and other administration officials have consistently
stated that a US exit from Iraq must await the establishment of political
democracy and the creation of an Iraqi military force adequate to maintain
order. Free markets and an open door to US investments as core constituents of
what "democracy" means for the Bush people, and their job will not be done
until these goals are secured as well. Also, by definition, a democratic
regime is run by "moderates," understood by the entire spectrum of the US
elite to mean political leaders who cooperate with US interests. Moreover, a
strong Iraqi security force, agreed by all to be a prerequisite for US
withdrawal, will be trained and equipped by the United States, historically a
certain recipe for continued close links to the Pentagon and the CIA. 

Thus, when President Bush refuses to discuss a timetable for US withdrawal, or
links US withdrawal to political and security benchmarks rather than to the
calendar, or when US general Tommie Franks states that US troops will be in
Iraq for at least 10 years, we should discard any assumptions that the United
States will leave Iraq voluntarily unless and until its economic and military
goals are secure. US control of Iraq would be a stupendous achievement for the
Bush administration and will not be lightly abandoned.

The Role of the January 30th Election for a Long-term Occupation

From this different perspective -- that the United States occupation of Iraq
is indefinite rather than limited -- the Iraq election at the end of January
assumes a different role and needs to be understood differently than the
criticisms coming from mainstream or elite opinion.

Granting that the Bush administration would like to be in a much stronger
position in Iraq than it is now, we can see that even an illegitimate and
severely flawed election with a problematic outcome will meet important needs
and serve many US interests. For example:

•                     Even critics of the election concede that postponing
them beyond January 30th risks alienating the support or acquiescence of
Ayatollah al-Sistani for the US-brokered political process.

•                     The election is mandated by the UN resolution
recognizing the United States as an occupying power in Iraq; going forward
with the election will further integrate the UN into the US occupation, while
postponing it would risk bringing the Iraq issue back before the UN at a time
of greatly diminished support for the occupation worldwide.

•                     Going ahead with the January 30th election will
diminish the effectiveness of opposition to Bush policies by those who support
a limited US occupation pending the establishment of a democratic Iraq
government. In the area of nation-building, their criticism will amount to the
ridiculous claim that the Bush people are proceeding too fast with
democratization, and/or the self-defeating argument that more troops are
needed in order to hasten the day when the United States can withdraw.

•                     Finally, it is widely reported that holding a "free
election" in Iraq is a necessary condition for Britain's Tony Blair to be able
to continue supporting the US in Iraq without further damage to the Labour
Party and his government.

There are additional gains that are likely to flow from the January 30th
election that also deserve our attention. From the perspective that the United
States intends to stay in Iraq indefinitely, the undemocratic nature of the
election, the likelihood of widespread violence on election day, the failure
to include the Sunni minority within the political process and its outcome,
the likelihood of a government dominated absolutely by Shi'ite politicians --
and even the prospects of civil war -- are not necessarily opposed to
long-term US interests. 

As in Vietnam and indeed any foreign occupation, the occupying power desires a
government strong enough to maintain internal order and the conditions for
doing business. At the same time, the client government cannot be strong
enough to demand that the occupier leave, nor strong enough to dispense with
the protection of the occupier's military forces against internal or foreign
enemies. That a Shi'ite-dominated government might ask the United States to
leave immediately is indeed a danger; but a united, nationalistic
Sunni-Shi'ite government would certainly demand an end to the occupation. A
sharply divided Iraq will be more likely to accept US control of Iraq's
military-in-training, rather than allow it to fall into the hands of one
faction or the other, or to develop political aspirations of its own. Finally,
a weak government, one needing a US military presence to provide a semblance
of security and a US military shield against real or imaginary threats from
Iran or Israel, will also serve the interests of long-term US occupation. 

Moreover, any Iraqi governing body will have to come to grips with the
physical destruction of their country. US political and military support for
the existing pipeline of aid and reconstruction money is premised on Iraq's
cooperation with the United States, and "cooperation" is clearly understood to
mean cooperation with existing US interests. Conversely, the expulsion of the
United States would make it almost impossible for Iraq to raise the vast sums
necessary for reconstruction.

Finally, the prospects of civil war -- perhaps the main danger raised by
critics of Bush's decision to go ahead with the January 30th elections -- also
take on a different meaning from the perspective of a long-term US occupation.
For people in the United States, "civil war" calls up images of Antietam and
Gettysburg. More likely would be a scenario like Northern Ireland, amplified
by heavier military equipment. A civil war scenario in which Iraqis were the
main victims would produce little additional pressure on the Bush
administration to withdraw US forces, and could conceivably gain the
occupation additional support, as the consequences of US withdrawal would
threaten an escalation of the civil war.

A Scenario for January 30th

To understand the way in which the January 30th election will serve the
interests of the Bush administration, we can try to anticipate the immediate
impact that it will have on the US population. The Iraqi election is a variant
of a "demonstration election." Classic examples of a demonstration election
are the US-sponsored elections in Vietnam in the 1960s, or in El Salvador in
1982. The purpose of these elections -- organized, financed, and choreographed
by the United States -- was to persuade US citizens and especially Congress
that we were invading these countries and supporting a savage war against
government opponents at the invitation of a legitimate, freely elected
government. The main purpose of a demonstration election is to legitimize an
invasion and occupation, not to choose a new government.

A demonstration election depends largely on the cooperation of the mainstream
media. The patriotic media's role is to include in its reporting certain
information or visuals while excluding others. For example, off the media
agenda are discussions of the right of government opponents to campaign
(without being killed); the absence of large-scale financing of favored
candidates by foreign governments or patrons; the presence of meaningful
freedoms of speech, the press, and assembly; the ability of voters to cast
their ballots freely and safely without intimidation by domestic or foreign
military forces or "death squads"; the existence of a truly secret ballot; an
honest counting of the ballots; and the assurance that the person who gets the
most votes will win the election. On the agenda for a patriotic mass media are
primarily election-day items: a large turnout (indicating voter support for
the election itself and thus identifying the election with "democracy");
statements by political leaders and "ordinary people" that they are voting
because they want freedom; and ineffective opposition to the election, perhaps
even military attacks, by opponents of the government. (In an election that
the United States opposes, such as the Nicaragua election in 1984, the media's
priorities are reversed: on the agenda is the question of the pre-requisites
of democracy; meaningless and thus off the agenda are the election-day events,
the long lines of voters, etc.)

The situation in Iraq differs in significant ways from the classic
demonstration elections in Vietnam and El Salvador. The most important
differences are that there is no incumbent government, that the anticipated
winners are not clients of the United States, and that the policies to be
pursued by the expected winners of the election are far from certain. While
the tools of election manipulation available to the occupying power are still
considerable -- financing campaigns, training candidates, assisting with
publicity, etc. -- Iraq's election and election outcome will be far more
problematic for US interests that the slam dunks in Vietnam and El Salvador.

These complexities, as well as the disasters of the occupation itself, have
forced the Bush people to make significant adaptations to the US-sponsored
election script. As framed by the Bush administration, rather than being an
election in support of a particular candidate or policy, the purpose of the
January 30th election is to show Americans and the rest of the world that the
Iraqi people support the theory and practice of democracy itself, and that
they are willing to identify "democracy" with the political process created by
the United States. As this political process is, according to the Bush
administration, the whole point of the occupation, the January 30th election
is a drama to demonstrate Iraqi support for the occupation itself.

Under these circumstances, the dramatic tension of the January 30th election
will focus on voter turnout. The US mass media has already established this
framing of the issue, and the election-day spectacle will pit the desire of
the Iraqi people to vote vs. the violence of rebels opposed to democracy. Few
of the long-term or background elements of a truly free election will receive
any media play, and the idea that a free election is incompatible with US
military occupation will be completely off the agenda. That violence keeps
many people from the polls, that many polling places will not be functioning,
and that election officials, candidates, and even voters will be attacked by
opponents of the US occupation will be important preoccupations of the US
media on election day. (Anticipating these obvious problems, the United States
has been taking steps to increase voter turnout -- same-day registration,
allowing voting at any polling place, allowing voting by Iraqis abroad, etc.
-- while at the same time trying to low-ball expectations of a strong voter
turnout.)

Despite the problematic nature of the key election success indicator -- voter
turnout -- it is predictable that the US media will present its election
coverage so as to be largely favourable to Bush, and without questioning the
strategy of "occupation until democracy." For the greatest number of US
citizens, the most important news about the election will come from
television, and the most important pieces of information will be in the form
of visuals, rather than voice-over. Election-day visuals are certain to
feature lines -- perhaps long lines -- of people waiting to vote, interviews
with Iraqi election officials and political candidates, affirmations by
rank-and-file voters that they have hope for the democratic process and that
they are proud to be voting in a free election for the first time, and
cautionary notes by US spokespeople that the road to democracy is long and
does not always run smoothly. Voiceovers will give the number of polling
places attacked, polling places that could not open, towns or cities in Sunni
areas where the election did not even take place, and voters and election
workers killed. Depending on the geography of killing, there may even be
visuals of dead voters or the aftermath of bombed polling places.

But the net effect of mass media coverage will be to frame the January 30th
election to Bush's advantage, and to the advantage of continued US military
occupation. However flawed the election-day events, the media will accept the
Bush administration's claim that its intention is to bring democracy to Iraqi,
and that rebel violence shows that it is democracy itself that opponents of
the US occupation most fear.

Conclusion

The United States is in a military and political quandary in Iraq. It is
apparent that it cannot "win" the war in any meaningful sense. The war is
draining much of its economic strength and alienating traditional allies, and
the Pentagon now finds itself constrained by a lack of resources from
undertaking new military initiatives. The number of Americans, and even
congresspeople, supporting an early exit from Iraq has risen significantly.
The Bush Iraq policy faces a crisis of legitimacy. Yet the Bush administration
has never been deterred by handwriting on the wall. To regain some of the
legitimacy it has lost it will go ahead with the January 30th election despite
the obvious risks and uncertain outcome. The hazardous position in which it
finds itself is the result of many factors, not least the worldwide opposition
to the war. Our opposition to the war will be strengthened by a clearer
understanding of US long-term goals in Iraq, and by the role played by dramas
such as the January 30th election in pursuing these goals.



Frank Brodhead is the co-author, with Edward S. Herman, of Demonstration
Elections: US-Staged Elections in the Dominican Republic, Vietnam, and El
Salvador (South End Press, 1984).