[Media-watch] {SPAM?} British government from the inside - scary stuff!

[Sigi D]

Dear MW friends,
Two articles (INDEPENDENT + THE TABLET) about how
things work in this government
by Clare Short,  an honest decent woman who learns
from her mistakes,  and thus has all my respect.
Her article in the Tablet (6.3.04) is quite
spectacular.
Listen to this: she writes quote "I cancelled all my
travel and read every scrap of intelligence that came
through on Iraq {before the war SD}. I asked for
briefings from my friends in MI6 and was surprised to
be told this required the Prime ministers consent". 
scary or what!!??
both urls and articles enclosed.
amazing stuff,
all the best, S
CLARE SHORT THE USES AND ABUSES OF INTELLIGENCE
http://www.thetablet.co.uk/cgi-bin/register.cgi/tablet-00860
http://www.thetablet.co.uk/cgi-bin/register.cgi/tablet-00860
The uses and abuses of intelligence
Clare Short 
After the Berlin wall came down, spying operations
were used in the service of justice and development.
With Iraq, reform was abandoned. The former Cabinet
minister blames politicians, rather than security
services 

There has been much talk of “intelligence” over the
last 18 months, yet beyond Le Carré novels I suspect
few can imagine how it works day to day. The
consequence is that the word is used to mystify and to
pretend that the political elite has access to crucial
insights not available to ordinary mortals. I met many
people who said, in the run-up to war, that Tony Blair
must know something that they didn’t. 

I want therefore – without giving away any secrets –
to describe how intelligence works for Ministers who
try to read it and make use of it for legitimate
purposes. I suspect that if we had a wider public
understanding of the way in which intelligence is
properly provided to government, there would be less
likelihood of its misuse to excite the media and
misinform the public. 

It is increasingly clear that, in our euphoria when
the Berlin wall came down and Nelson Mandela was
released from prison, we did not appreciate how deep a
challenge this change would be to makers of foreign
policy and shapers of international institutions. The
Cold War had shaped military, diplomatic and
intelligence priorities for a very long time. For the
intelligence agencies, the Cold War was clear and
deadly serious. We needed brave people to take risks
in order to understand the forces at work because, if
things went wrong, the consequences would have been
catastrophic. 

When I took over as Secretary of State for
International Development, there were regular files
put on my desk containing globules of information
about the countries in Africa and Asia in which we
were interested. But little of it seemed particularly
useful to our purposes and overall the department gave
little priority to the intelligence. 

But from time to time, the “C” of the day came to call
on me. Intelligence was keen to discuss how much more
they could do to help the Department for International
Development (DfID). We had enjoyable discussions, but
it always ended with my teasing them about the fact
that the Cold War was over and they were casting about
for a new job, and I wasn’t very keen on employing
them to spy on the governments with whom we were
trying to develop partnerships for the reduction of
poverty. 

I became increasingly focused on the need to end
conflicts – particularly in Africa – where there had
been a massive growth of civil conflict in the
Nineties. This led to the establishment of a pooled
fund devised to bring together the work of the Foreign
Office, the Ministry of Defence and Department for
International Development. 

It was at this stage that one of C’s very bright
underlings came to see me again. He said they had few
resources for Africa but would like to do more. He was
very interested in conflict prevention and told me
that his agency had instant access to African
presidents whenever they asked. He gave me two
interesting books on Sierra Leone. This was a
different approach and we agreed it would be
beneficial to work together to try to understand who
was supplying arms and money, where the corruption was
coming from and who was getting in the way of cleaning
up management of defence budgets and arms procurement.


We also shared thinking on our efforts to support
reform in government institutions and economic
management in Pakistan, our worries over Nepal and
whether there was anything we could usefully do to
ease the tension and suffering of the people on both
sides of the line of control in Kashmir. 

Over time we developed a strong, mutually respectful
relationship based on a shared understanding that if
we could help end conflicts, build competent,
accountable state institutions and reduce poverty this
was in the interests of the people of the developing
world and in the UK national interest. 

Then came 11 September 2001. My very able friend was
pulled off work on Africa and required to focus on
global threats. We also lost our analyst working on
arms supplies to the militias in eastern Congo. The
events of 11 September created a major new challenge,
but the first response was, I think, wiser than the
deeply misconceived “war on terror” that came later.
Immediately after 11 September, the whole world wanted
to support the US and the Security Council set up a
Committee, chaired by our Ambassador to the UN, to ask
every country to share information and tighten up on
money laundering so that all would work together to
counter al-Qaida. Then the focus shifted to Osama bin
Laden organising al-Qaida in Afghanistan. Again, the
world came together to challenge the Taliban to hand
him over and when this was refused, to overthrow the
Taliban. As the war ended, the UN worked with the
World Bank to build competent state institutions. 

But international cooperation began to break down when
voices in the US started advocating war in Iraq.
Senior people in the administration with a
long-standing commitment to the overthrow of Saddam
Hussein were willing to mislead their country into
believing that al-Qaida was based in Iraq. Echoes were
heard in our country, but our Prime Minister assured
us we would only act through the UN. Given that UN
sanctions were causing enormous suffering in Iraq I
was in favour of action through the UN. My hope was
that we would hold on to Tony Blair’s ankles and he on
to George Bush’s and we could get the road map to a
Palestinian state under implementation. We would then
work to lift sanctions to help the Iraqi people to
overthrow the Saddam Hussein regime and begin to usher
in a new era of hope in the Middle East. 

But the drums of war got ever louder. I cancelled all
my travel and read every scrap of intelligence that
came through on Iraq. I asked for briefings from my
friends in MI6 and was surprised to be told this
required the Prime Minister’s consent. Normally I saw
them as I pleased. I made a fuss and the briefings
were allowed. We in DfID were anxious not to make war
more likely by preparing for its inevitability, but
like the UN decided we must prepare for all
eventualities. We asked Defence Intelligence for a
briefing on the likelihood of the use of chemical and
biological weapons in the event of war. I was briefed
by the MoD on details of the planned military
campaign. 

The rest is history – sad history. The tragedy is that
the UK might well have been able to insist on progress
on the road map and on two UN resolutions and avoided
the chaos in Iraq and the strengthening of al-Qaida
that has followed the war. On top of this, I am afraid
that the deceit on the road to war and the deliberate
marginalisation of the UN led to an unforgivable
failure to prepare for the aftermath of the inevitable
speedy victory. The international community was
willing to come together to support the reconstruction
of Iraq. Tony Blair persuaded me to stay in the
Government on the understanding that we would
internationalise support for Iraqi-led reconstruction.
Sadly our Prime Minister did not feel able to stand up
for a proper UN lead and thus we have the continuing
chaos in Iraq. 

I am certain that we could have handled Iraq much
better if we had abided by “just- war” teaching. It is
clear now that the US set a date for war and we went
along with it, and thus the weapons inspector Dr Hans
Blix was not allowed to finish his work. We did not
indict Saddam Hussein, nor even explore the impressive
alternative policy put forward by the American
Churches. But my conclusion is that the mistakes lay
with the politicians and not the security services.
The leaders of those services “went native” with No.
10 as the Hutton inquiry revealed. But the significant
mistakes in Iraq were political – not intelligence
mistakes. 

The spying on Kofi Annan’s office is a footnote. Until
the war with Iraq, the UK was working so closely in
support of Kofi Annan and his plans for UN reform that
it did little harm. But once Iraq brought division,
manipulation and dishonesty at the UN, the practice
became deeply insidious. I thought I could use the
Katharine Gun case to bring it to light, and thereby
bring it to an end. For some reason, revealing that it
was going on caused a vicious onslaught from No. 10.
The Prime Minister claims I was deeply irresponsible
to reveal it, but whether this is true depends on
whether we should be spying on Kofi Annan. If so, then
it should continue and it is irresponsible to reveal
it is happening. If not, then the revelation is a
means to stop it. The Prime Minister could have said
he was not aware of it and would investigate, but
instead we heard bluster over the sacred nature of
intelligence. It was suggested that I was damaging the
national interest and ought to be prosecuted. I think
it much easier just to stop spying on Kofi Annan. 

Today the world is much more bitterly divided than it
was before the Iraq war. Twenty thousand Iraqis and
many US and UK soldiers have died, the terrible
suffering and killing in Israel and Palestine
continued and al-Qaida is stronger. Our security
services have more money and their personnel are no
longer casting around for a role. Africa has slipped
way down the agenda. I am certain the present approach
cannot succeed and we have to turn back to justice and
development to heal the dangers of the world. The
question is how long it will take and how much
suffering and hatred will flow before we get there. 

Clare Short is Labour MP for Birmingham Ladywood and
former Secretary of State for International
Development.
CLARE SHORTS ARTICLE IN THE INDEPENDENT
Clare Short: There was never an honest debate in
cabinet
http://argument.independent.co.uk/low_res/story.jsp?story=542347&host=6&dir=140
http://argument.independent.co.uk/low_res/story.jsp?story=542347&host=6&dir=140
Most ministers saw little intelligence and knew only
what they read in the press

19 July 2004

Blair: the attacks mount up 

Blair fights to take Iraq off political agenda 

Dramatic end-of-year debate may give Labour
backbenchers the summer blues 

Clare Short: There was never an honest debate in
cabinet 

Leading article: Mr Howard's opportunism should not
distract from the wider scandal of the Iraq war 

Andreas Whittam Smith: Scarlett's best service would
be to resign 

The Prime Minister and those who speak for him keep
telling us that the Butler report found that the prime
minister acted in "good faith'' over Iraq. The report
does not say this but Lord Butler said it at his press
conference.

It's worth asking what good faith means. I think it
means that a person was convinced that what they were
doing was right. It does not mean they were right or
wise or accurate in their claims. We might also ask,
is it possible to lie in good faith?

When he made his statement on the Butler report to the
House of Commons, the Prime Minister reiterated the
twin arguments he now uses to justify his Iraq policy.
The first being that the world is better off without
Saddam Hussein. The second that, after 11 September,
there was a greatly increased danger that WMDs and
terrorism would come together and he therefore had to
act.

I believe the Prime Minister holds both these views in
good faith. But, on both, he is wrong. The people of
Iraq are overwhelmingly glad that Saddam Hussein has
gone but, by big majorities, say their lives are now
worse. It is also widely acknowledged at al-Qa'ida is
much strengthened, the Middle East angrier and more
unstable and as many as 7,000 Iraqi soldiers, 13,000
civilians and 1,000 coalition troops have so far lost
their lives.

The claim that the war stopped WMD and terrorism
coming together is more extraordinary. There were of
course no WMDs used in the events of 11 September
2001. There is evidence that Osama bin Laden has shown
an interest in obtaining chemical, biological and
nuclear expertise. The Butler report summarises the
evidence and concludes that there is no evidence that
he has capability. But it also points out that the
Joint Intelligence Committee made it clear that,
although there had been contacts between al-Qa'ida and
the Iraqi regime, there was no evidence of
co-operation. Thus, the Prime Minister may have
believed in good faith that he was preventing WMDs and
terrorism coming together but such a belief has no
basis in reality.

The report looks into the use of intelligence by the
Attorney General to decide that there was legal
authority for war. It concludes that there was no
reliance on intelligence and that what Lord Goldsmith
did was "require the Prime Minister, in the absence of
a further United Nations Security Council resolution,
to be satisfied that there were strong factual grounds
for concluding that Iraq had failed to take the final
opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations
... and that it was possible to demonstrate hard
evidence of non-compliance and non-cooperation with
the requirements of UN Security Council resolution
1441''.

After negotiations on a further Security Council
resolution broke down, the Attorney General wrote to
the PM seeking confirmation that it was unequivocally
the Prime Minister's view that Iraq was in breach of
resolution 1441. The Prime Minister, without
consulting the Cabinet, confirmed that this was his
view shortly after Dr Blix had destroyed more than 70
ballistic missiles and reported improved co-operation
from the Iraqi regime.

The Prime Minister also misled his Cabinet, Parliament
and country in his claim that the French said they
would veto any second resolution. In fact, Dr Blix had
asked for more time and we now know that President
Chirac and other Security Council members had made it
clear that, if Dr Blix failed, it would be necessary
to authorise war. Presumably, Lord Butler would argue
that the Prime Minister engaged in this deception in
good faith.

When Lord Butler asked who was responsible, he said it
was a collective failure. Yet the report draws
attention to the Prime Minister's very informal style
of decision-making. It tells us there were papers
written to inform cabinet discussion that were not
circulated, therefore cabinet members were unable to
take advice or reflect on issues in advance. However,
we are told that the Cabinet discussed Iraq on 24
occasions. But most members of the Cabinet saw little
intelligence, read no papers and knew only what they
read in the press.

Mr Blair raised Iraq after the summer recess of 2002
at every cabinet meeting. He would start by saying a
few words, inviting Jack Straw or Geoff Hoon to speak
and then intervening repeatedly to inform the Cabinet
of developments. Their advice was never sought. They
were kept informed and most were willing to go along
with the Prime Minister but there was no collective
decision which was thrashed out in honest debate and
to which the Cabinet then adhered.

In fact, since 1997, there has not been cabinet
government in Britain. Power is centralised around the
Prime Minister's informal entourage and patronage is
used ruthlessly to keep people in line. The Prime
Minister does not hold himself responsible to Cabinet
or Parliament but to the media, which is why Alastair
Campbell and Peter Mandelson have been so powerful.

Under the Blair regime, much more than under Margaret
Thatcher, British constitutional arrangements are
crumbling. The votes of one in four of the people in
the 2001 election produced a majority of 64 per cent
in the Commons. This means almost anything can be
rammed through the Commons and the only resistance
comes from the House of Lords. Power has been sucked
into No 10 and policy is driven by headline-grabbing
announcements. It means that checks and balances have
broken down, and that leads to ill-considered policy -
most tragically in Tony Blair's policy towards Iraq.

The author was international development secretary,
1997-2003, when she resigned from the Government. 






	
	
		
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