[Media-watch] FW: Out On A Limb - Part 1

[David Miller {FMS}]

> ----------
> From: 	Medialens Media Alerts
> Sent: 	Monday, October 20, 2003 16:12 PM
> To: 	Friend
> Subject: 	Out On A Limb - Part 1
> 
> MEDIA LENS: Correcting for the distorted vision of the corporate media
> 
> October 20, 2003
> 
> 
> MEDIA ALERT: OUT ON A LIMB - PART 1
> 
> A Senior Source at The Independent on Iraq, WMD and Editorials
> 
> 
> We recently canvassed the views of a senior journalist at the Independent
> about that paper's response to UK government claims on Iraq and its
> alleged weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The journalist has written many
> of the paper's editorials on Iraq over the last couple of years, and also
> writes many of the editorials on foreign policy more generally. We are
> grateful for the response.
> 
> In Part 1 of this alert we quote extensively from our source's response (3
> October) to our initial query, and include a minimum of commentary. In
> Part 2, we include our full reply.  
> 
> The source began by arguing that since no WMD have been found in Iraq,
> there had likely been, "a failure of intelligence AND a failure of
> judgement by our political leaders, i.e. I would not argue that failure of
> intelligence absolves Blair et al."
> 
> The source continued: "One of the reasons I say that is because I have
> been one of the arch-sceptics at the Indy [The Independent], arguing from
> way back that Iraq probably did not have WMD and that any capability it
> once had was destroyed after the Gulf War and that the UN sanctions had
> basically worked. I tend to think that if I could reach this conclusion,
> then Blair etc. could at least have asked rather more searching questions
> about the intelligence than they did."
> 
> We find it remarkable that this senior Independent journalist can proclaim
> themselves an "arch-sceptic", since arch-scepticism in response to
> government claims on WMD was notable by its absence in the paper. Indeed,
> the Independent overlooked or ignored some of the most obvious and
> credible evidence that Iraq had been, in the words of chief UNSCOM
> inspector, Scott Ritter, "fundamentally disarmed". We return to this in
> Part 2.
> 
> Our source continued: "I was especially concerned about three aspects. One
> was the provenance of the 45 minute claim. I actually asked the foreign
> office the same question that "Mr A." was asking in the communication that
> came to light during the Hutton inquiry: could the 'source', however
> reliable, have had an ulterior motive to producing this piece of info at
> just that juncture. I found it very suspect that this turned up just as
> the British government was known by the Americans to be having
> difficulties with public opinion here, and asked whether it might not have
> come from the Chalabi people via the Pentagon.
> 
> "Another [concern] was the principle behind the conclusion that Iraq still
> had WMD. What the UN and the US and the Brits did was to tot up what they,
> and others, were known to have sold Iraq in advance of the Gulf War,
> subtract what they knew had been used and ask Saddam to account for the
> rest, while claiming that he actually had it. Hence the 'exact' figures of
> anthrax, VX, etc that we were regaled with at every turn. This had a
> simple logic to it, but I felt that it was highly dubious. Third was the
> assertive tone that the Foreign Office and Downing Street always took when
> they made their accusations. I found it propagandistic and immediately
> suspect for that reason."
> 
> There was, nevertheless, an astonishing failure on the part of journalists
> to scrutinise claims originating from the Foreign Office and Downing
> Street. This is surely a good example of the distorting influence of
> powerful sources - the third filter in Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky's
> propaganda model of media control. Journalists are highly dependent on
> these sources - such as the Downing Street propaganda machine - for fresh
> news. Journalists who cause offence risk losing their main access to
> information. Media analyst Phillip Knightley recently provided a rare
> glimpse into this world in the Independent on Sunday:
> 
> "Back in the 1960s, the Sunday Times appointed journalist and author Tony
> Howard as its Whitehall correspondent, announcing, 'The job of a newspaper
> is to bring into public information the acts and processes of power.
> National security alone excepted, it is the job of newspapers to publish
> the secret matters of politics whether the secrets are the secrets of the
> Cabinet, of Parliament, or of the Civil Service.'
> 
> "The then Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, was having none of that. He
> quickly shut Howard down. Howard remembers: 'He said he understood I was
> only trying to do my job but he had a job to do, too, and his was more
> important than mine. He made it very plain that all conventional sources
> of information would remain shut until I was willing to return to the cosy
> but essentially sham game of being a political correspondent.'" (Phillip
> Knightley, 'Of secrets and spies', The Independent on Sunday, August 17,
> 2003)
> 
> Political correspondents in 2003 are subject to similar pressures of the
> "sham game". To take on power, today, is also very much to risk being
> "shut down". Our source points out: "my views on the war were very close
> to the editor's, so there is probably little divergence between the
> leaders and my signed columns." In particular, the "editorial line was ...
> sceptical of the WMD claims - though we all have to remember that those
> times were different when the inspectors were in Iraq. There was always
> the chance that the anthrax, VX, etc. could be found the very next day and
> I don't think any editor felt it wise to go out on a limb completely."
> 
> This is fair enough, but then no reasonable critic has suggested that the
> media should have stated categorically that Iraq had +no+ WMD whatever.
> The real issue is why the paper's editorials - and more generally its news
> reporting - failed to reflect authoritative testimony from weapons
> inspectors to the effect that Iraq posed no +threat+ whatever. 
> 
> We asked: "Surely The Independent's editors and journalists ought to be
> asking fundamental questions, such as why the US and UK governments would
> break international law, and mislead their respective populations, to
> launch an invasion of Iraq. Which interests were served by so doing?"
> 
> Avoiding the crucial question about whose interests might be served by
> invading Iraq, the response we received was that: "the problem with
> arguing no holds barred that Britain broke international law is that the
> Attorney General produced (only just) a measure of legal cover and I think
> they will continue to cite that, if pushed. The [Foreign Secretary Jack]
> Straw argument is that Iraq was in breach of international law and that
> action was already sanctioned by resolution 1441, so the war was not
> illegal. It would have been illegal, on the other hand, if there had been
> a vote on the so-called second reoslution and the US and Britain had been
> defeated.
> 
> "Now I know this is hair-splitting, and my view is that there is a clear
> mismatch between the reasons why Blair said he was going to war (WMD, the
> risk to national security  etc) and the reasons he and Straw are now
> giving (Iraq's alleged non-compliance),  but I think they are probably
> saved from flagrant illegality on the technicality of the failed second
> resolution (and the deliberate ambiguity of  1441). As a paper, we haven't
> really got around to considering this yet. The Hutton inquiry has taken
> precedence."
> 
> The Hutton inquiry has indeed served a useful function in diverting media
> scrutiny from the government's war crimes. Moreover, there is a
> considerable body of respected legal opinion that holds that the US-UK
> action +was+ clearly illegal. The leading legal peer Lord Alexander of
> Weedon QC recently accused attorney general Lord Goldsmith of "scraping
> the bottom of the legal barrel" to give a spurious legitimacy to the war
> on Iraq. Lord Alexander reportedly said that the great majority of the
> international lawyers who had expressed a view did not agree with the
> attorney general's advice. ('Goldsmith "scraped the legal barrel" over
> Iraq war', Clare Dyer, The Guardian, 15 October, 2003)
> 
> However, this is presumably an editorial line that would involve "going
> out on a limb", for any newspaper wishing to remain on good terms with
> Downing Street.
> 
> Our source then goes on to address the issue of whether Blair consciously,
> or unconsciously, misled the country - a side issue beside the reality
> that the government +did+ deploy deception in leading the country to war:
> 
> "Personally, I am not certain that Blair consciously misled the country.
> It would be easier to think so, as it opens the way for believing  also
> that he wanted to please the US, preserve the transatlantic alliance,
> special relationship etc. at all cost and considered that this overrode
> all other considerations. I fear that Blair may have convinced himself
> that Iraq presented a real and imminent threat and was at a loss as to how
> to convince the sceptical British public. (You could sense the desperate
> frustration in Downing Street especially through last autumn as phlegmatic
> Brits steadfastly refused to get alarmed about the threat from Iraq). 
> 
> "The one explanation I offer is that the shadow of 9/11 loomed much larger
> in Blair's thinking than it did in public opinion generally, and that he
> was terrified of being held responsible when - for instance - the Houses
> of Parliament were demolished by terrorist attack on his watch. I find
> this absurd. No one proved any link between 9/11 and Iraq, nor even
> between Iraq and terrorism generally."
> 
> The assertion that Blair was particularly concerned about an attack on
> British targets is contradicted by his own post-9/11 statements on Iraq.
> In November 2001, for example, Blair stood shoulder to shoulder with
> Jacques Chirac insisting that "incontrovertible evidence" of Iraqi
> complicity in the September 11 attacks would be required before military
> action would be considered.
> 
> The source goes on: "It is also worth noting that the Indy has so far
> stopped short of calling for Blair to resign (I would have done, but have
> not written a column that would accommodate that). So far, I think, the
> feeling is that the political route (being booted out of office by the
> electorate or an unhappy party) would be more effective than a legal
> challenge. I also happen to think that the real reason why [Blair's former
> communications director Alastair] Campbell went ballistic about [BBC
> reporter Andrew] Gilligan and the BBC is that he saw the vulnerability of
> Blair's legal position if the charge stuck that Downing Street had
> inserted intelligence into the dossier 'knowing that it was wrong'.
> 
> "I am generally sympathetic to Gilligan and so has the paper been in its
> leaders... because I think the thrust of his report was absolutely right.
> I can see, however, that in those details - especially the charge that the
> 45 minute detail was inserted even though it was known to be wrong -
> Campbell may have seen big legal dangers ahead that could threaten Blair's
> survival.  I think that is why he - in his words - opened a new front at
> the FAC [Foreign Affairs Committee], partly to divert attention and partly
> to ensure that this legal weakness was closed."
> 
> In Part 2, Media Lens replies to the Independent source, describing the
> paper's failure to challenge the government's deceptions on UN sanctions
> and inspections. 
> 
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