[Media-watch] Philip Taylor on the War

[David Miller]

 Have a look at this apology for 'coalition' lying.  This guy is a leading
UK writer on propaganda and works at leeds university.  He advises NATO on
propaganda and lectures to the government psyops courses at chicksands.
Strangely this is not acknowledged at the end of his piece!   If anyone
wants more info on him (including his previous work) ask me or google him.



 To view the entire article, go to
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A45187-2003Mar28.html

 Credibility Can't Win Hearts and Minds Without It

 By Philip M. Taylor  LEEDS, U.K.

 The furious reaction in the United States to the stance taken by
France,
Germany and the United Nations toward the current war in Iraq appears to
represent a serious failure in international communication. While Europe
debated whether it should join the war against Iraq that started 10 days
ago, it failed to appreciate that America was psychologically already at
war
and had been since Sept. 11, 2001. It didn't matter that America's new
state
of mind was plain for all to see in the doctrine of preemption spelled
out
by President Bush in his 2002 State of the Union address and, indeed, in
the
U.S. media generally. Some European leaders had perhaps not understood
how
much the world's surviving superpower had changed since 9/11. And those
who
had understood may not have realized themselves how reluctant they were
to
criticize that change -- at least until the war against Iraq forced
their
hands.

 Historically, when a nation goes to war, media and public alike rally
behind the government's war effort and the troops, supporting "our boys"
(and now girls) against "them," the enemy. This is clearly happening
today
in the United States. But Britain, America's traditional and staunchest
ally, has gone to war amid unprecedented public skepticism. During the
1982
Falklands War, public approval of the Thatcher government's decision to
fight 8,000 miles from home was around 80 percent. During the 1991 Gulf
War,
it was near 70 percent. Throughout the so-called humanitarian
intervention
in Kosovo in 1999 -- a conflict whose legality under international law
was
hotly contested, since it had been undertaken without U.N. support -- it
was
65 percent, rising to 70 percent once "our boys" went into action. But
before the buildup to the current conflict, public support in Britain
stood
at an astonishingly low 37 percent. And this was high compared with the
rest
of Europe, where approval never topped 30 percent.

 After 9/11, a wave of sympathy for Americans swept the globe, even as
Americans themselves agonized about "why they hate us so much." Today,
for
all Washington's emphasis on the 40-odd countries in the "coalition of
the
willing," the United States finds itself fighting in Iraq with only a
little
help from Australia and Poland and, of course, from a Britain split down
the
middle.

 What happened?

 As far as the propaganda war is concerned, the lines have been drawn
for
some time. On the one side, antiwar sentiment has become synonymous with
anti-Americanism, and the anti-American themes are by now
well-rehearsed:
The attack on Iraq is a war for oil; it is a "crusade" against Islam; it
is
unfinished Bush family business. And then there is Palestine,
"Coca-colonialism" and U.S. "McDomination." On the other side, there is
Washington arguing that this is a war to liberate the Iraqi people from
Saddam Hussein, to introduce democracy into the Arab world through
"regime
change" and to win the United States recognition as a force for good in
the
world, its virtue demonstrated by the waging of preemptive war against
international terrorists and the "axis of evil" regimes that support
them.

 An embryonic version of the American view proved persuasive with the
Afghanistan campaign after 9/11, because of the known relationship
between
the Taliban and al Qaeda. But then came the 2002 State of the Union
address
and the full flowering of the doctrine of preventive war. In a way, the
controversy it sparked came as a surprise. After a decade of many people
asking why the U.S.-led coalition "failed to finish the job" in 1991,
why is
there so much opposition to the idea of a reassembled coalition seizing
the
initiative and dealing with Hussein now? Is it really because the
leaders of
America and Britain are indeed losing the propaganda war? Or is it
because
the Bush doctrine is quite simply a product that cannot be sold to "Old
Europe" or anyone else who is reluctant to change the rule of the modern
system of nation-states -- accepted, before 9/11, since the Treaty of
Westphalia in 1648 -- that no state should interfere with the internal
affairs of another?

 Unlike Britain, America seems to be faring well at home -- so far. The
domestic media are largely supportive, some excessively so. For years
after
Vietnam, the U.S. military feared that the American public no longer had
the
stomach for either casualties or prolonged conflict. Time will tell
whether
this is still the case, although some polls suggest that 9/11 was such a
shock to the American psyche that the Vietnam syndrome might finally
have
been superseded. Abroad, however, the United States has a serious
problem.
It may be just that it needs to get its propaganda act together and
explain
more clearly, and therefore more persuasively, the dangers that lie
ahead
for the whole world. But that would be dealing with the world as it
might
be, not as it is. Another departure from history: a world in which the
American dream precipitates a global nightmare.

 Propaganda is a word that democracies fight shy of. Tainted by its
historical associations with Hitler and Stalin and authoritarian states
like
Iraq, all sorts of euphemisms are used to distance the conduct of a
democracy's propaganda from that of its adversaries. "They" tell lies,
whereas "we" tell the truth. "Truth," the tired old axiom says, "is the
first casualty of war." Actually, it is a casualty long before the
fighting
begins and long after it ends. While the war goes on, the propaganda
struggle for the moral high ground narrows to issues such as collateral
damage, treatment of prisoners of war, and the rights and wrongs of
bombing
television stations. We have seen it all before, although perhaps not
quite
as fast nor from so many reporters as we are seeing it now. But it does
not
necessarily change people's views, especially if the unfiltered
television
images resonate, confirm or coincide with preexisting ideas already
firmly
held -- about Saddam Hussein, about Bush, about war, about America,
about
the French. At that point, no amount of skilful propaganda will budge
them.

 The contemporary catchphrase for propaganda is "perception management."
An
ugly phrase, it is the product of an MBA-influenced belief that wars can
be
packaged in the style of a marketing or advertising campaign. It
predates
Charlotte Beers, the former advertising executive who became U.S.
undersecretary of state for public diplomacy and public affairs in
October
2001. It is based on the idea that war, or any policy, can be "sold"
like a
product. After 9/11, there may not have been much need to market war in
the
United States, but the concept appears not to be working quite so well
with
more critical target audiences: Iraqis, the Muslim world generally and,
most
disconcertingly, the United States' NATO allies.

 In any propaganda campaign, credibility is the key. The easy part is
appealing to people who want to hear the messages and may already
believe
them. The hard part is preaching to the unconverted. Why should Iraqis
buy
the idea of liberation when they were let down so badly last time and
when
it appears to them that they are being invaded, rather than liberated,
now?
Why shouldn't the Muslim world believe that this is a crusade against
Islam?
Why should Europe buy into the bold idea of "regime change" imposed from
outside?

 There are plenty of reasons, actually. Just ask the Afghans liberated
from
the Taliban or the Kosovo Albanians freed from Serbian military
oppression.
Ask Kuwaitis, Bosnian Serbs, the people of East Timor. And all of these
are
Muslim. But is this propaganda? Those successes are "facts"; propaganda
is
about lies, isn't it? Well, no, it isn't. The democratic propaganda
tradition is about news and credible views. That does not mean the whole
truth is always told, especially in a military context, where
operational
security and troops' safety are at stake. And discerning the truth is
complicated, if anything, by the incessant television coverage from
Iraq;
news comes in so fast that we barely have time to evaluate its wider
meaning
before the next images fire in, the 24/7 real-time broadcast news cycle
rolls on and the war against terrorism moves temporarily into the
background.

 No one party -- not the coalition, not the Iraqis, not the antiwar
campaigners, nor the journalists (whether embedded or not) -- has a
monopoly
on the truth. That would be incredible. But democratic governments, if
they
have the courage of their convictions, should argue what they see as the
truth as forcefully and as convincingly as they can, and should be
prepared
to counter the truths of their opponents. That is what democracy based
on
consensus rather than force means. Still, you cannot force your truth
upon
somebody else if they do not want to believe it, which suggests that
Washington's problem abroad might be less a failure of communication
than
the failure of an inherently incredible policy.

 As Britain entered the second week of war against Iraq, public support
had
risen to 56 percent -- quite a jump. But that is still far lower than
anything a democratic nation going to war has expected of its public
since
Vietnam. Tony Blair may be a hero in the United States for standing
shoulder
to shoulder with Bush, but his stance clearly does not mesh with the
perception of the British and European public about the justness of his
cause, the moral high ground of his position and his ability to explain
the
connection between the events of Sept. 11 and Baghdad's role in them.
The
truth as Blair understands it may indeed prove to be the biggest
casualty of
this war.

 Philip Taylor is professor of international communications at the
University of Leeds, U.K., and the author of "War and the Media:
Propaganda
and Persuasion in the Gulf War" (Manchester University Press).