[Media-watch] Were terrorists really planning a dirty bomb? - 9/4/2004 - Jones

[Julie-ann Davies]

http://argument.independent.co.uk/commentators/story.jsp?story=509848

Brian Jones: Were terrorists really planning a dirty bomb?

It transpires that this exotic sounding material had not actually been
obtained

09 April 2004



After more than 15 years in chemical warfare intelligence, I cannot recall
hearing about osmium tetroxide until this week. I spent countless days
discussing potential chemical warfare agents with experts from Porton Down
and across the world. We considered at length the agents and the precursor
chemicals which could be used to make them for inclusion in the export
control lists designed to defeat WMD proliferators and terrorists. There
were numerous chemical compounds of concern, but osmium tetroxide was not
among them.

Suddenly we are told that the security services have foiled a fiendish plot
by international terrorists to detonate a dangerous chemical weapon based on
this compound in London. In some way the signals intelligence collectors at
GCHQ in Cheltenham, their US counterparts at the National Security Agency
(NSA), MI5 and the police are all involved. There were telephone intercepts
within this country and to Pakistan. A link with al-Qa'ida is implied, but
not explicit. The term "dirty bomb" is used.

However, as the story unfolds, expert chemists and toxicologists tell us
that this unusual chemical is not "controlled." It can be bought on the
internet in glass containers. Although it is hazardous there are other
chemicals in industrial, medical and academic use that are both more readily
available and potentially more dangerous. It seems just as likely that
osmium tetroxide would be added to conventional explosives to promote a
bigger bang.

It is not clear whether the targets mentioned - the London Underground,
Gatwick or Heathrow airports and perhaps a shopping centre within the M25 -
were discussed by the terrorists or are the speculation of the security
officials involved. It then transpires that this exotic sounding material
had not actually been obtained by the putative terrorists, nor is there any
indication that arrests have been made. How then has the "terror gas attack"
been foiled?

It all begins to sound like so much froth. But it may be dangerous froth. It
has never been sensible to discuss so openly the source of intelligence
information. With the amount of publicity about mobile phone communications
over the last few years, it is surprising that anyone is unaware of their
vulnerability to interception. And if the authorities really believe that
osmium tetroxide is a chemical we should be worried about, why on earth are
they advertising it on every media outlet in the western world and beyond?
As a "red herring" it may mislead the terrorists, but it will also confuse
many of those charged with guarding our security and managing the
consequences of an attack.

At first, it crosses my mind that this information could have entered the
public domain as the result of an ill-conceived attempt to boost the
reputation of one or other of the hard-pressed intelligence and security
agencies. Much criticised in the wake of the Iraq war for the absence of
WMD, and increasingly pressed by the Treasury to justify their funding,
there is already evidence of a propaganda offensive with "leaks" at the
early stages of the Butler review.

But then, with Mr Blunkett's statement on Wednesday, I wonder whether our
new knowledge of osmium tetroxide was inspired by the Home Office to support
their policy initiatives. Alternatively, he may simply be seizing an
opportunity. Either way, the intervention does not inspire confidence that
the terrorist threat is being properly addressed.

The discovery of a plot to detonate a "dirty bomb" laced with poisonous
chemicals is said by the Home Secretary to justify tough measures to combat
terrorism. The term "dirty bomb" is most often associated with radiological
weapons and creates a vague connection with a nuclear attack. The clever use
of language invites the mind to an interpretation beyond the words used. But
if he thinks that such a bomb would be the stuff of Armageddon to which the
Prime Minister recently referred, he is quite wrong. It would not be much,
if at all, beyond the conventional attacks with which the IRA made us all
too familiar in recent decades.

Although I believe Mr Blair was a little hysterical in invoking Armageddon,
he is, unfortunately, absolutely right to raise the spectre of real chemical
or biological warfare agents in the hands of Osama bin Laden's terrorists.
We know that those closer to the core of his organisation have made progress
towards acquiring capabilities that could dwarf the Madrid bombings, an
"osmium tetroxide bomb" or even the 11 September attack on the World Trade
Center in New York.

Whatever the background to this particular episode, I find it frightening
that those who are leading our defence against terrorism either do not
properly understand the requirement or are prepared to see the public misled
as a short term expedient to achieve policy goals, however necessary.

The Leader of the Opposition has expressed concern about uncertainty over
who is in charge of counter-terrorism. I think there is much greater concern
that those who claim to be in charge do not, apparently, have a clue about
the problem.

The writer was head of the branch of Defence Intelligence Staff responsible
for the analysis of intelligence on nuclear, biological and chemical warfare