[Media-watch] three things

[Billy Clark]

Three things here - if you're not on holiday david! - first a news round 
up on the north of the area, then a statement by KADEK a Kurdish group 
which gives their position on the area (Good background from a source 
relegated off the agenda for all the usual reasons) and then the 
statewatch round up with lots of links.  Remember folks if its too long 
file it or delete it, save it for later, skim it, surf it - quote it, 
burst out crying - do what you want.

Yours billy

1.  Washington Turns To Ankara For Help In Iraq (RFE/RL) 07/25
2.  FM Gul Denies Turkey Seeks Business in Exchange for Troops 
(Washington
Times) 07/26
3.  US Remains Coy on Where Turk Troops Would Be Deployed (Slate) 07/27
4.  US, Turkish Talks on Troop Deployment Intensify (Turkish Daily News) 
07/29
5.  FM Gul: Decision on Troops Could Take Months (AFP) 07/28
6.  Sami Shoursh: What About Turkish Troops in Iraqi Kurdistan Iraq? (Al
Hayat) 07/31
7.  Henri Barkey: New Basis for an Old Friendship (Los Angeles Times) 
07/27
8.  Dinella/Sitilides: Repairing Turkish-American relations (Washington
Times) 07/27
9.  Ken Pollock Interviewed on Turkey, Kurds in Iraq (Turkish Daily News)
08/01
10. Parliament Moves to Curb Military (MGK) Powers (Turkish Daily News) 
07/29
11. Turkey Reform Targets Army Power (BBC) 07/30
12. Turkish Parliament to Approve Laws Boosting EU Bid (Bloomberg) 07/30
13. Ankara Moves To Curb Military's Influence, While EU Awaits
Implementation (RFE/RL) 07/31
14. Turkey Curtails Military's Political Power (Los Angeles Times) 07/31
15. "A Revolution, of Sorts": Taming Generals and Knocking at Europe's 
Door
(Economist) 07/31
16. Jonathan Feiser: Turkey and US: Alliance Not Yet Beyond Repair 
(Eurasia
Insight) 08/01
17. Turkish Companies Win Iraq Construction Contracts: Minister (AFP) 
07/31
18. Islam 'Should Not Stop' Turkey Joining EU (Financial Times) 07/31
19. Syrian FM in Ankara for Talks on Iraq, US Policy 
(Arabicnews/Agencies)
07/30
20. FM Gul Address US/Turkish Relations at Washington Think-Tank (WINEP) 
07/30
21. Groups Participate in Human Rights Initiative (Turkish Daily News) 
08/01
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1) Washington Turns To Ankara For Help In Iraq
RFE/RL
By Jean-Christophe Peuch
25 July 2003

The United States yesterday said that the 20,000 to 30,000 soldiers its
allies have so far agreed to send to Iraq are not enough to help its 
troops
pacify the war-torn country. Desperate for military assistance, 
Washington
is now requesting help from Turkey. But the prospect of Turkish soldiers
risking their lives in Iraq without a proper international mandate has
triggered a new controversy in Ankara.

Prague -- The administration of U.S. President George W. Bush is pressing
more countries to help consolidate its victory over Saddam Hussein by
contributing troops to its current efforts in Iraq.

Poland, Hungary, Romania, Georgia, and Ukraine, among others, have 
already
agreed to dispatch soldiers to Iraq. But Washington says this is not 
enough
and that other willing contributors are needed.

After soliciting India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh earlier this month,
Washington is now appealing to Turkey to send soldiers to Iraq as part of
the U.S.-led stabilization force.

Addressing reporters after talks in the U.S. capital with his Turkish
counterpart, Abdullah Gul, Secretary of State Colin Powell yesterday said
the request was made by U.S. Central Command chief General John Abizaid
when he visited Ankara on 18 July.

This was the first time Washington admitted that it has officially turned
to Turkey for help. Powell said the U.S. was expecting NATO ally Turkey 
to
make a quick decision. "We would like a decision as soon as possible, but
that is a judgment for the Turkish government to make. And I am pleased
that [Minister Gul] indicated that they would be working on this in as 
fast
a manner as possible," Powell said.

Powell declined to elaborate further on Turkey's possible contribution,
saying logistical details would be discussed later between Gul and U.S.
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.

Turkish newspapers have speculated the U.S. might eventually ask Ankara 
to
send between 3,000 and 12,000 soldiers for possible deployment between 
the
Iraqi capital Baghdad and the city of Tikrit to the north. These reports
have not been confirmed.

In comments to "The Washington Post" on the eve of his talks with Powell,
Gul said the Turkish government would agree to meet the U.S. demands only
if it receives strong assurances that Ankara will play a prominent role 
in
Iraq's reconstruction as well. "We want to be part of the big picture in
Iraq," he said.

For Turkish political commentators, there is a clear sense of deja vu.
"Once again it smells the motion," columnist Mehmet Ali Birand writes in
Istanbul's "Milliyet" daily, referring to the political turmoil stirred
earlier this year when the U.S. required permission to use Turkey as a
staging ground for a northern offensive against Iraq.

Despite efforts by the Turkish government to secure U.S. financial
compensations, Ankara lawmakers last March rejected a cabinet motion
authorizing the deployment of up to 62,000 U.S. soldiers on national
territory. The Turkish denial ushered in a period of simmering tension
between the two capitals.

Relations soured further last month when U.S. troops detained a group of
Turkish soldiers in the Iraqi Kurdistan city of Al-Sulaymaniyah on
suspicion of plotting against the Kurdish administration of neighboring
Kirkuk. Turkey's influential military described the incident as the most
serious "crisis of confidence" ever experienced by the two allies.

In an apparent bid to ease tensions, Powell yesterday welcomed Turkish
efforts to help rebuild Iraq, notably Ankara's recent decision to
facilitate the transit of humanitarian aid across the Turkish-Iraqi 
border.

"I expressed my appreciation to [Minister Gul] for the significant offers
of assistance we have received from Turkey for reconstruction, 
humanitarian
and other support efforts in Iraq to help the Iraqi people rebuild their
society from the devastation caused by Saddam Hussein and to assist in
bringing a better life to the people of Iraq," Powell said.

Whether Powell's praise will help overturn the Turkish public's 
reluctance
to see its soldiers contributing to U.S. post-Saddam efforts is unclear.
Many in Turkey oppose the deployment of troops in Iraq out of fear for 
the
soldiers' lives. Others would like troops to remain strictly confined to
northern Iraq to contain any upsurge of autonomist militantism in 
Turkey's
predominantly Kurdish border area.

Turkey's opposition Republican People's Party (CHP), which controls 
roughly
one-third of the seats in parliament, has made it clear that it will 
block
any government motion asking for authorization to send troops to Iraq.

Alluding to the firestorm triggered by the government's previous motion 
to
reject the presence of U.S. troops, CHP lawmaker Oguz Oyan today 
criticized
the cabinet of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan for "ignoring the
lessons of the past."

Even lawmakers of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) have
voiced their opposition to Washington's request, saying no Turkish 
soldiers
should be sent to Iraq without a proper mandate from the United Nations.

The controversy has spread out of parliament, with most political parties
accusing the cabinet of yielding once again to U.S. pressure. Mete
Gundogan, a deputy chairman of the Islamic Saadet (Felicity) party,
yesterday went so far as to accuse Erdogan of turning Turkey into a U.S.
puppet. "We are not being ruled by a single-party government, we are 
being
ruled by a U.S.-Erdogan coalition," Turkish media quoted Gundogan as 
saying.

----

2) Envoy denies talk of Iraq troops for business pacts
Washington Times
By David R. Sands
July 26, 2003

Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul yesterday denied that his country 
was
demanding major
reconstruction contracts for Turkish businesses in neighboring Iraq as 
the
price for sending badly
needed troops to bolster the U.S.-led peacekeeping mission there.

Mr. Gul, wrapping up two days of talks with senior Bush administration
officials, said his
government was still considering a Pentagon request to send thousands of
Turkish troops to help
police Iraq, but made clear that Turkish special forces stationed in 
Iraq's
Kurdish-dominated
north would remain in place until the U.S.-led coalition established full
authority in the region.

"Whether intentionally or from ignorance, there has been this image put
forth that Turkey is
bargaining for everything," Mr. Gul told a gathering yesterday at the
Washington Institute for
Near East Policy, a think tank.

"It was not true during the Iraq war and it is not true now," he said.

The Washington Post reported Thursday that Mr. Gul had explicitly tied
Turkey's participation in
a peacekeeping force to economic and business contracts for Turkish 
firms,
arguing such
promises were needed to win parliamentary approval for the mission.

The Turkish diplomat said his country was ready and able to supply basic
services such as water
and electricity for Iraq, but that major reconstruction and 
infrastructure
contracts "were a matter
for private companies," not the government.

Mr. Gul met with Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, Defense Secretary
Donald H. Rumsfeld,
National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice and Vice President Dick 
Cheney.
He was the
highest ranking Turkish official to visit Washington since the
traditionally close bilateral
relationship suffered unprecedented strains after Ankara's refusal in 
March
to allow U.S. troops
to deploy through Turkey for the Iraq campaign.

Relations were damaged further by the July 4 detention of 11 Turkish
soldiers in northern Iraq
by U.S. troops, an incident that Mr. Gul yesterday called "unfortunate" 
and
"not acceptable."

The soldiers were released after fierce Turkish protests, but questions
still surround the mission
of the arrested soldiers and the circumstances of their arrest.

Mr. Powell on Thursday pressed for a quick decision by Turkey on the
peacekeeping mission,
but the issue is a sensitive one for Ankara.

The Iraq war was deeply unpopular, and the new government of Prime 
Minister
Recep Tayyip
Erdogan faces a deep economic crisis and concerns that prolonged
instability in Iraq could
revive separatist feelings among Turkey's own restive Kurdish minority.

U.S. officials have not released details of the request made to Turkey's
government, but it is
expected that any Turkish contingent would not be deployed in the north,
for fear of arousing
new ethnic tensions.

"I think the request was made in full consideration of how Turkey and
Turkish troops could
contribute to stability in Iraq and not lead to any complications," State
Department spokesman
Richard Boucher said yesterday.

Repairing the U.S.-Turkish alliance could face further strains as the 
Bush
administration
pressures other Middle East regimes in the war on terrorism.

Even as the United States has increased pressure on Syria in recent 
weeks,
officials in Turkey
announced yesterday that Syrian Prime Minister Mustapha Miro would go to
Ankara next week
for two days of high-level talks, the first visit by a Syrian prime
minister to the Turkish capital
since 1986.

-----

3) U.S. remains coy about where Turkish troops would go
Slate
By Timothy Noah
July 27, 2003

Earlier this week, Chatterbox expressed some anxiety about pending 
meetings
between Turkey's
foreign minister, Abdullah Gul, and various high-ranking Bush
administration officials who are
trying to persuade Turkey to send troops into Iraq. Chatterbox questioned
the wisdom of this
desire, given the potential for Turkey to turn an ostensible peacekeeping
mission into an assault
on Iraq's Kurds. American forces in Iraq arrested, earlier this month, a
Turkish special forces
unit that reportedly planned to assassinate the Kurdish governor of 
Kirkuk.
Why invite more
trouble for the only group in Iraq whose loyalty the United States can
count on?

A principal reason the United States is so solicitous toward Turkey is 
that
several countries
we've approached, including France and Germany, insist that the United
Nations oversee any
international peacekeeping force in Iraq. At a press conference after his
July 24 meeting with
Secretary of State Colin Powell, Gul was asked whether he favored
involvement by the UN or
NATO. "UN [or] NATO involvement definitely will make the job easier," Gul
answered. The
implication, though, was that Turkey wouldn't insist on it.

The urgent question remains: Where would the Turkish troops go? Sending
them into Iraqi
Kurdistan would be a disaster. But, at least publicly, the Bush
administration isn't ruling that out.
Asked about this at the July 24 press conference, Powell replied, "I used
to be in the
Department of Defense, but I am not now. So I will yield to my colleagues
in the Pentagon...."

Back in Ankara today, Gul indicated to reporters that Turkey won't make a
final decision on the
troop request before September. By then, perhaps the Bush administration
will have recognized
the wisdom in turning administration of Iraq over to the United Nations,
mooting the issue of
Turkish involvement. But don't count on it.

---

4) Troops talks speed up in Ankara
Turkish Daily News
July 29, 2003

In an unscheduled, closed-session meeting Tuesday, head of the military 
and
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan discussed a possible decision to 
deploy
troops in Iraq to help the stabilization mission of the United States and
Britain in a sign of intensifying talks on the US request as it pushes 
for
a quick decision.

The meeting of Erdogan and Chief of Staff Gen. Hilmi Ozkok in Erdogan's
office, which lasted more than 1.5 hours, followed a Cabinet meeting late
Monday, where Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul briefed the government 
members
on his visit to Washington that ended last weekend and the troops issue
that was raised in that visit.

Ozkok reportedly briefed Erdogan on preparations undertaken by the 
General
Staff on a possible troops deployment in Iraq, as well as the upcoming
meeting of the Supreme Military Council (YAS).

Ozkok and Erdogan are also expected to meet President Ahmet Necdet Sezer 
in
a summit Thursday.

The government announced it would discuss a possible dispatch of troops
with the president, General Staff and Foreign Ministry experts before
making a final decision.

"We are trying to evaluate the issue in all respects. Both the Foreign
Ministry and the General Staff will examine that issue. We know about the
sensitivity of the Turkish public. I hope it will be settled in the way
most proper to protect Turkey's interests," government spokesman Cemil
Cicek told reporters after Monday's meeting.

Despite signals of urgency from Washington, the government has signaled
that a decision on whether or not to send troops might take a few months,
saying the issue must be carefully and extensively examined.

"They're studying the request. We have been assured it's under active
consideration, and we'll expect to hear when they're ready," a spokesman
for the State Department said in Washington.

Spokesman Richard Boucher said the United States wanted to hear a quick
decision because that was what Gul had told U.S. officials while in
Washington: "Why the Secretary said he expected to hear as soon as
possible? Because that's what the Turkish Foreign Minister told him, that
they would take it up and look at it immediately in Ankara, and then 
we'll
see when they get -- when they get done," he said.

When asked about Turkish media reports that a decision would take a few
months, Boucher declined to comment and said instead that the U.S.
administration would wait to hear from the Turkish government on the 
timetable.

Invitation from Iraqi council for Turkish troops

Gul said in Washington that a NATO or U.N. mandate would make the Turkish
government's job easier as
it tries to secure deputies' support for sending troops to Iraq.

Newspaper reports said that a mid-way formula could be found if NATO 
agreed
to provide logistics
support for Turkey when necessary. In this way, the government might
justify a decision to send troops to Iraq, saying this was authorized by 
NATO.

Another formula could be to receive a special invitation from Iraq's
newly-set governing council for Turkish troops. Assistant Secretary of
State Marc Grossman told the CNN Turk television Tuesday that this could 
be
an interesting option.

Boucher said Gul and U.S. officials looked at the issue of international
mandate under which Turkish forces could operate in Iraq and added that 
the
issue was still under discussion.

"We know of 30 countries already whose participation in stabilization
operations is confirmed. So the effort being made for stabilization in 
Iraq
is clearly international," Boucher said.

The State Department announced Monday that some 30 countries have already
announced commitment to contribute to efforts to stabilize Iraq and 
Boucher
said whether the issue would be taken to the U.N. platform depending on 
how
discussions with countries, including NATO members such as France and
Germany, would proceed.

Gul also said that Turkey would like to send troops to Iraq as part of a
broader political perspective that would allow Turkey to have a say in 
the
political restructuring of Iraq.

"We do not want to be there simply as a police force," Gul said.

Turkey has also offered assistance to help restructuring of Iraq in the
field of construction, water and electricity supply, etc.

Boucher said the United States had given back "a non-paper that went
through some Turkish proposals and on how they might work" during Gul's 
visit.

The government meeting Monday concluded that a parliamentary 
authorization
was necessary to send troops to Iraq. But it might find it difficult to 
get
the approval amid growing anti-U.S. sentiment among even its own 
deputies,
sparked by detention of Turkish soldiers in northern Iraq on July 4.

Risks associated with sending troops to Baghdad and its neighborhood are
another discouraging factor as more and more U.S. soldiers are killed in
ambushes and attacks in this area called the "Sunni Triangle."

----

5) Turkish decision on Iraq troops will take several months
AFP
July 28, 2003

ANKARA / Turkey needs several months to decide whether to send troops to
Iraq to help the United States restore order in the war-torn country,
Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul said Monday.

"I guess this can take a few months," Gul, who visited Washington last 
week
to discuss the issue,
told NTV television.

The Turkish government sees a US request for military help as an 
opprtunity
to improve ties,
which have sunk to an all-time low following Ankara's failure to back the
war in Iraq and the US
arrest of 11 Turkish soldiers in Kurdish-held northern Iraq.

"I believe the problems (in Turkish-US ties) have been overcome... They 
are
ready to work with
us in Iraq," Gul said.

But anti-US sentiment is still running high in the Turkish parliament,
which, Gul said, would have
to approve any ultimate government decision to contribute troops to
security operations in Iraq.
The legislature will be in summer recess from August to October.

Gul said Turkey did not want to be just a "gendarmerie force" in Iraq, 
but
also wanted a say in
the country's post-war reconstruction.

"Anything like 'Take that many soldiers and use them as you want' is not
possible," the minister
said, adding that his country would insist that its force be placed under
Turkish command.

He expressed hope that a Turkish military role in Iraq could help the
country win a say in the
political reshaping of the country.

Ankara fears that the Iraqi Kurds could gain too much influence and
self-rule following the
downfall of Saddam Hussein, a prospect that could set an example for 
their
restive cousins in
Turkey.

----

6) What About Turkish Troops In Kurdistan Iraq?
Al Hayat
30 July 2003
by Sami Shoursh*

Despite the apparent harmony in the American-Turkish relations, the U.S.
remains strongly opposed to any Turkish military presence inside Iraq.
There are three main reasons for the American position:

The first reason is that such deployment will undermine the prestige of 
the
American forces in Iraq after the U.S. had been granted wide powers in 
that
country by the UN.

The second reason is that the deployment of Turkish troops in Iraq will
heighten tension in the region. In the period that preceded the ouster of
the regime of President Saddam Hussein, Damascus and Tehran reluctantly
accepted the presence of Turkish troops inside Iraq due to the absence of
the central authority from the Northern areas. Things have changed now, 
and
the Kurds represent at present a main factor within the central 
authority.

The third reason is that the deployment of Turkish troops in Kurdistan 
Iraq
will only aggravate the Kurdish-Iraqi struggle with Turkey, and will lead
to undermining the American efforts to build a stable Iraq.

Turkey justifies its relatively small military presence in Iraq, (2,000
troops and 60 tanks); in saying that such troops are fighting terror,
especially the pursuit of remnants of the Kurdish Workers Party. And 
while
the Americans regard that party as a terrorist organization, they 
maintain
that its activity has been greatly reduced. They add that Turkey will
receive the support of all if it withdraws its small force from Iraq and
began to fight that party within its areas.

Moreover, Washington is prepared to guarantee a wider cooperation between
Ankara and Iraqi Kurds to quell any movement by that party. Washington 
also
insists that, after the ouster of the Iraqi regime, the Kurds are more
capable to protect the Northern borders as American officers train them 
on
such missions.

Yet Ankara reiterates its fears from the cooperation between the 
Americans
and the Kurds of Iraq. It fears most that such relationship will lead to
improving U.S. ties with the Workers Party, which had given up its armed
struggle a few years ago. Washington, on the other hand, reassures Ankara
that such a possibility is hardly possible. Ankara adds that its concerns
include protecting the Turkmen minority in Iraq. Such a pretext is
ridiculed by the Americans who insist that, as the occupying force, they
will protect the rights of the Turkmen. Washington adds that it is about 
to
demand that Iran withdraw from Iraqi areas near the borders it had
occupied, which means that the U.S. will also have to demand the Turkish
withdrawal from Iraqi areas as well. Both Iran and Turkey have a problem
with the Kurds.

But the Turks remain unconvinced. The strong yet quiet disputes between 
the
military and political institutions in Iraq indicate that the issue is
unresolved within Turkey. Also, the U.S. is not about to take a decisive
action since it needs the Turkish participation in a peacekeeping force 
for
Iraq. Yet Washington is hesitant about inviting Turkey to take part in 
any
international action inside Iraq due to the turbulent relations between 
the
Turks and some members of the Ruling Council, especially the Shiites. 
More
important is the angry reaction of the Kurds if the Turks are allowed to
pass through their areas to Baghdad or other cities.

While the Turks deny any justification for fears from their military
presence in Iraq, the U.S. is not reassured and demands Turkish 
withdrawal
from Kurdistan Iraq. In the meantime, the Iraqis wait to see how the
Americans will carry out the missions that the UN entrusted them with.

* Mr. Shoursh is an Iraqi Kurdish writer.

-----

7) A New Basis for an Old Friendship
Los Angeles Times
By Henri J. Barkey
( Chairman of the international relations department at Lehigh 
University,
served on the State Department's Policy Planning Staff from 1998 to 
2000.)
July 27, 2003

BETHLEHEM, Pa. - Turkish-American relations have reached a new low, and a
key reason is that the Iraq war has undone two myths in Washington about
Turkey.

The first was that Turkey was too important an ally to ignore in a war
against Iraq. A pillar of U.S. containment of Saddam Hussein was
U.S.-British enforcement of the no-fly zone over northern Iraq from the
Turkish air base at Incirlik. Before the invasion of Iraq, the Pentagon
sought to build on the relationship. It wanted Turkey to open up its
territory to U.S. combat forces to create a second front. Convinced that
the U.S. could not go to war without Turkey, Ankara first bargained and
then refused. Yet, the easy military defeat of Iraq and the Kurds' warm
welcome of U.S. forces in northern Iraq have demonstrated to the
administration that Ankara's importance is limited.

The primacy of the two countries' military-to-military relationship was 
the
second myth to be deflated by the war. The Pentagon was traditionally the
most pro-Turkey of all U.S. institutions, jealously guarding its special
relationship with the Turkish military. But during negotiations to secure
access to bases in Turkey before and during the war, the Turkish military
was not helpful. It was telling that Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D.
Wolfowitz blamed the Turkish military, not the new pro-Islamist 
government,
for parliament's rejection of the U.S. request for the second front. 
Then,
during the war, the Turkish military on a number of occasions denied the
U.S. permission to launch missions from Turkey to rescue imperiled 
American
forces, infuriating the Pentagon.

The recent U.S. raid on the headquarters of the Turkish special forces in
northern Iraq has further estranged the two militaries. The 11 Turkish
soldiers arrested July 4 were suspected of training pro-Ankara forces to
assassinate the pro-U.S. Kurdish governor of Kirkuk and stir up trouble.
None were in uniform or carried any forms of identification, as required 
by
agreements between the two countries. Although the administration 
believed
that neither Ankara nor Turkish military leaders had directed or even had
prior knowledge of any such operation, the incident only deepened 
Pentagon
suspicions of Turkey's intentions.

The Turkish military is equally suspicious of U.S. plans for the
quasi-autonomous Kurdish enclave. After Ankara nixed the idea of a second
front, Washington denied Turks entry into northern Iraq beyond their
existing 1,500-strong contingent. Turkish soldiers were eager to help 
their
Turkmen allies there and, more important, contain the ambitions of Iraqi
Kurds. Having fought Kurdish rebels at home throughout the 20th century,
Ankara feared that Kurdish autonomy in Iraq would encourage Kurds in 
Turkey
to seek autonomy or even independence. Washington's long-held belief that
peace in Iraq depends in part on recognizing the distinct character of 
the
Iraqi Kurds within a federal Iraqi state continues to make the Turkish
military nervous as well.

In addition, the detention of the Turkish soldiers deeply offended 
Turkish
pride and further fanned anti-Americanism in Turkey. Some Turks have
compared the U.S. treatment of the soldiers to that received by U.S.
diplomats in Iran during the 1979 hostage crisis.

Ironically, the current row between the two militaries may give a boost 
to
political reform in Turkey. The Justice and Development Party, which took
over the government last November, promised more democracy and membership
in the European Union, the fastest and most efficient way to 
revolutionize
Turkey. But the country's secular military and civilian establishment
distrust the party and its leader, Tayyip Erdogan, chiefly because of 
their
Islamist roots. Yes, the party continues to harbor elements partial to
anti-Western, Islamist and xenophobic rhetoric and is prone to mistakes
that needlessly antagonize secular Turks. But it has made undeniable 
moves
toward the political center. For example, the government pushed through
parliament an EU harmonization package that included provisions 
eliminating
restrictions on freedom of speech and reducing restrictions on minority
languages and culture. Significantly, it accomplished this without going
through the powerful National Security Council, which reflects the
officers' preferences. The government is now considering introducing a
package that would further extend individual freedoms and reform the 
military.

All this makes the military deeply anxious, because the price of 
fulfilling
Turkey's EU candidacy may be a promise by the military to stay out of
politics. A next step is addressing the divided island of Cyprus, where 
the
military has so far blocked the government's intentions to move toward a
solution proposed by U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan.

The Turkish government's recent actions demonstrate that its commitment 
to
a reform agenda is far more serious than those of its predecessors. For
this, it deserves Washington's support. Last week's visit by the Turkish
foreign minister, Abdullah Gul, should ease the way for a visit by 
Erdogan,
presenting Washington with an opportunity to acknowledge Turkey's
democratic ambitions and thus form a new basis for relations between the
two countries. The administration's invitation to the Turkish military to
participate in peacekeeping operations in Iraq suggests that the two
countries may be putting past disagreements behind them. It should take 
the
added step of giving Ankara a stake in Iraq's future by encouraging 
Turkish
private-sector participation in the second round of reconstruction
contracts and sending Turkish nongovernmental organizations to help 
rebuild
Iraqi civil society.

The sooner Ankara, and especially its military, stops looking at Iraq
through the narrow perspective of the Kurdish issue, the sooner
Turkish-American relations will improve.

----

8) Repairing Turkish-American relations
Washington Times
By Harry Dinella/John Sitilides
July 27, 2003

By the time Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul concluded his meetings
with senior Bush administration officials and congressional leaders last
week, in
an urgent and appropriately-timed effort to repair frayed U.S.-Turkey
relations, he realized the old saying that "Turkey has no friends" is 
not true.

The United States has long been Turkey's best friend, dating back to the
beginning of the Cold War. It still is, but the friendship has been 
severely
tested in recent months by Ankara, highlighted by Turkey's failure to
support Operation Iraqi Freedom and Turkish fury over the arrest and
detention by U.S. forces of Turkish commandos planning to assassinate a
Kurdish leader in northern Iraq. Since the early 1950s, U.S.
policymakers have held Turkey in high esteem as a secular democratic 
Muslim
nation confronting Soviet forces on itsborder and anchoring NATO's
southeastern flank with a standingarmy second in size only to that of the
United States. After the Cold War, official Washington touted Turkey's
significance as a strategic partner that facilitated U.S. efforts to
stabilize the
former Yugoslavia and Somalia while also combating terrorism and 
potential
threats from rogue regimes in Iraq,Iran, and Syria on its southern and
eastern borders.

For more than a decade, Incirlik Air Base became the focal point for U.S.
and British aircraft protecting Kurds within the "no-fly" zone in 
northern
Iraq. By the mid-1990s, Turkey had cemented a security and economic
relationship with Israel. After the U.S. defeated the Taliban in 
Afghanistan,
Turkey successfully completed a six-month rotating command of the
international security force in Kabul. For its part, the U.S. provided
economic and military assistance to Turkey when Josef Stalin
threatened it after World War II, supported Turkey's entry
into NATO in 1952, encouraged the country's expanding
democracy over the decades, and generally supported or
tolerated Turkish foreign policy and security objectives,
sometimes at the expense of relations with other allies and friends.

The Bush and Clinton administrations have strongly
supported Ankara's aspirations to become a member of the
European Union. President Bush endorsed a $16 billion IMF
loan package that was essential to shoring up Turkey's failing
economy and averting economic meltdown. The U.S. backed

construction of the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline, which could
make Turkey a key transport node for bringing Caspian Sea
oil to international markets. In addition, it assisted Turkey in
resolving disputes with the EU over the deployment of the
bloc's Rapid Reaction Force.

Washington has worked to gently nudge a reluctant
Turkey toward a Cyprus settlement that would dramatically
increase living standards for Turkish Cypriots and enhance
Ankara's diplomatic stature with the EU and the international
community. The U.S. has long encouraged dialogue between
Greece and Turkey to resolve their bilateral differences, and it
was Washington's intervention, while Europe slept, that
prevented war between the two countries in 1996.

However, starting in late 2002 and culminating on March 1,
2003, Turkey's image in Washington as a staunch ally and
friend steadily and radically diminished. U.S. military planners
once considered Turkish cooperation necessary to wage a
quick and decisive two-front war against Iraq. Months prior to
the war, Washington embarked on exhausting negotiations
with Ankara to gain access to Turkish territory for the
deployment of 62,000 U.S. troops and equipment that
included the 4th Infantry Division as the spearhead that
would secure northern Iraq and lead the southward offensive
toward Baghdad.

In December, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz
returned from Ankara assured by the Turkish General Staff
that Turkey was on board, save for details. Negotiations
culminated in a proposed U.S. grant and loan credit package
exceeding $30 billion. But, on March 1, the Turkish parliament
rejected America's request for territorial access for a second
front against Saddam Hussein.

After that stunning defeat, Turkish leaders pressed for
further negotiations in hopes that accommodation might be
reached, but those talks led nowhere. The failure to reach an
agreement prevented the world's most modern and lethal
army division from attacking Saddam's forces from the north,
compelling U.S. planners to essentially wage a one-front war.
Turkey then refused to permit combat air operations to
originate from its territory, negating the use of the
once-strategic Incirlik Air Base by coalition warplanes for the
duration of the war. Turkey did permit flights carrying
humanitarian supplies to transit its air space, in return for a
Washington pledge of $1 billion in aid.

Since the coalition's Iraq victory in late April, Turkey has
had the opportunity to be helpful by not interfering in
U.S.-led efforts to secure Iraq and establish institutions that
will lead to a federal state of Kurds, Turkomen, and Assyrians
in the north, Sunnis in central Iraq, and Shi'ites in the south.
But Turkey has continued to express its longstanding
concern that a semi-autonomous Kurdish entity in northern
Iraq, governed by elected representatives of 3 million Kurds,
would inspire a separatist fervor among Turkey's 12 million
ethnic Kurds, many of whom bore the brunt of a 15-year war
that killed 35,000 people. There have been reports of
recurring Kurdish attacks inside Turkey, and Ankara faults
Washington for permitting Kurdish groups to control the
oil-rich regions of Mosul and Kirkuk.

U.S. officials reject Turkish mistrust of American motives,
especially since Washington stood alone among Western
capitals for many years in its condemnation of Kurdish
separatists as terrorists, in line with Turkish policy.

The Turkish commandos' attempt to assassinate a Kurdish
politician, thwarted only by their timely capture by American
troops, was viewed by Washington as gross interference in
the achievement of U.S. objectives, threatening to trigger
violent turmoil across northern Iraq and delaying
establishment of a governing system for all of postwar Iraq.
Turkey had the opportunity to participate significantly in
this successful war, as well as in the shaping of postwar Iraq,
and its parliament opted on March 1 not to do so. As Defense
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has stated frequently, actions
have consequences.

Hopefully, Mr. Gul is returning to Ankara convinced that
Turkish policymakers must come to terms with the U.S. and
British triumph in Iraq, achieved with no political, financial, or
logistical support from Ankara. The Bush administration is not
about to let Turkey's unfounded fears over the future of
Iraq's Kurds ruin all that the U.S. and its coalition partners
have accomplished through loss of life and limb.

Ankara should reassess its policies in northern Iraq and
accept U.S. assurances that coalition forces will strive to
create a democratic federal state in Iraq. American forces will
be stationed in Iraq for many years to come. Ideally, Turkish
troops will be stationed there as well, alongside troops from
other NATO members and nations seeking to help reform and
democratize the Middle East and broader Muslim world.
But the Pentagon will not beg for Turkish troops, and Mr.
Gul smartly avoided insisting on unrealistic conditions for such
deployment. It is in Turkey's interest to participate in the
reconstruction of Iraq, and it is in America's interest to have a
constructive Turkish partner that respects American sacrifices
and shares its vision for the future of the region.

As Mr. Gul was clearly told again last week, Washington
has no intention of abandoning Iraq to civil war, anarchy, and
dismemberment. Instead, Kurds, Sunnis, and Shi'ites are
each expected to govern autonomously in Iraq - and protect
the rights of smaller minorities such as the Turkomen - in a
system somewhat akin to Texans, Virginians and Alaskans in
the U.S. federal system. This eventuality can be constructive
for Turkey, which cannot destabilize northern Iraq and expect
to progress in its European Union accession program or its
partnership with the United States.

Foreign Minister Gul came to Washington with a singular
opportunity to repair the fissure in relations with the Bush
administration. Ankara and Washington can - and must -
put the latest incidents behind them and work together
toward the stabilization of Iraq and the establishment of an
Iraqi democracy.

Further degradation of Turkish-American relations, through
activities such as other covert operations, would be the
quickest way to ruin Turkey's long-term friendship with its
best friend, the United States. That might make, for the first
time in a half-century, that old Turkish saying come true.

Lt. Col. Harry Dinella (U.S. Army retired) is adjunct professor of
international relations at George Mason University, and
John Sitilides is executive director of the Western Policy Center.

----

9) 'Kurdish state will be founded if Iraq splits up'
Turkish Daily News
By Mehmet Ali Birand
August 1, 2003

Kenneth Pollack is one of Washington's favorites these days, a leading 
Iraq
expert working for the prestigious Brookings Institute, one of the rare
persons capable of making a logical, cool-headed, objective assessment. 
In
the course of an interview, which will be aired on CNN TURK at 17:00 
today,
he made thought-provoking remarks on the possibility of the emergence in
northern Iraq of an independent Kurdish state.

If Iraq plunges into turmoil...

He made remarks in the following vein: "Stability in Iraq would be the 
only
factor that could prevent the establishment of a Kurdish state. If the 
new
Iraqi administration in Baghdad takes matters into its own hands, if the
wheels of the economy start turning, and if the opposition to the U.S. 
can
be kept under control, the Kurdish will not be able to make any move.

"If the situation in Iraq does not stabilize, if it leads to a civil war
(what he means is that if Shiite and Sunni Arabs rebel against the 
central
administration to be established and if developments got out of hand,
leaving the country without water or electricity in a climate of turmoil
where the wheels of the economy cannot turn), then there would be the
possibility of Kurds declaring independence to secure their own region."

How would the U.S. act in such a case?

According to Pollack, a U.S. that has been bogged down in a swamp may not
say "Stop!" to the Kurds in such a climate of turmoil. While tackling 
with
the incidents in other parts of the country it may feel the need to 
condone
the Kurds' move. Hence the great importance of Iraq's territorial 
integrity
with respect to Kurds.

Though his views conflict with those of the Bush Administration, he
believes that for Turkey it would be the right thing to influence the
developments by sending troops to Iraq.

For Clinton, Turkey was the star of the region

Pollack, who had worked with the Clinton Administration, says that the
latter viewed Turkey in a different light than does the Bush
Administration. He says, "Clinton saw Turkey as the star of the region." 
He
says that the Bush Administration views the world in a different light,
acting aggressively. He thinks that this approach will not change as long
as Bush remains in power.

Why is the U.S. administration, which had displayed its anger towards
Turkey due to the "motion incident" of March 1, now seeking troops from
Turkey, throwing flowers at Turkey?

In Washington one gets more than one answer to that question: For one
thing, they have seen that having a fight with Turkey is not beneficial 
to
them in Iraq and that a new leaf must be turned in relations with Turkey.
Also, they are realizing more with each pasing day that they must share
responsibility with other countries in Iraq.

According to Pollack, the Bush Administration has pushed itself into a
tight spot because it has failed to plan well the aftermath of the war. 
The
U.S. public is already asking, "What is happening? The war was over, 
wasn't
it?" Turkey will increasingly be affected by the situation in Iraq.

A 'surplus value' for Turkey

Relations with the U.S. is the main issue with which those who plan the
EU's future are currently preoccupied. The Bush Administration is
increasingly putting a strain on the transatlantic strategic cooperation.
Gone is the old warmth between the EU and the U.S., and Washington and
Brussels are each going their own way.

This "divorce" is pushing the EU to formulate new defense strategies. We
will undoubtedly be seeing the EU take a more active stance in the Middle
East, the Caucasus, the Balkans and Central Asia.

In the course of such a critical process, the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK)
will be the most important "surplus value" Turkey's has. In fact, it is 
the
biggest "asset" Turkey has, an asset from which Turkey will benefit 
enormously.

For the EU, entering into cooperation with the TSK on a wider scale will 
be
the easiest and soundest way of having its weight felt in these regions.
The TSK knows the region better than anyone else. It would be in a 
position
to be more effective to the extent it increases its mobility and its 
firepower.

When the EU calculates the pros and cons of whether to admit Turkey into
its ranks as a full member the most important "surplus value" it will 
take
into consideration will be the TSK -- though this view may astonish some 
of us.

-----


10) Parliament moves to curb MGK powers
Turkish Daily News
July 29, 2003

Parliament was expected to pass a set of reforms seriously reducing 
powers
of the military-dominated National Security Council, MGK, this week 
after a
bill to that effect cleared the Justice Committee on Monday.

The so-called Seventh Harmonization Package was initially expected to be
forwarded to the Parliament floor for final discussion and voting on
Tuesday, but Parliament's busy agenda apparently delayed a session on the
package as of the evening hours.

The bill envisages serious limitations that would eventually make the 
MGK a
nonfunctional body. The opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) voted
Monday to pass the bill, which is set to limit military influence in 
public
life by curbing powers and responsibilities of the Secretariat-General of
the MGK, the most effective tool through which the military exercises
influence on politics.

During the Justice Committee debates, the biggest criticism against the
bill came from Mustafa Agaoglu, who attended the debates on behalf of the
MGK's Secretariat-General. Agaoglu, an advisor for the Secretariat, said
the following in the meeting:

"The MGK Secretariat-General is effectively abolished. It will no longer 
be
able to fulfill these three
functions: It will not be able to devise psychological operation plans; 
it
will not be able to work on National Security Policy; it will not be able
to devise plans on mobilization and war preparations.

"The MGK Secretariat-General is attached to the Prime Minister's Office. 
If
the prime minister assigns it a task, it will fulfill it. Other than 
that,
it never undertakes tasks on its own. How will decisions made at the MGK 
be
followed to make sure that they are implemented?"

Justice Minister Cemil Cicek, on the other hand, said in response to
Agaoglu's criticisms that the
government had consulted with the General Staff on provisions of the
seventh package that deals with the status of the MGK 
Secretariat-General.

"Security needs do not have to be discussed on such a broad scale. We are
going to conduct necessary consultations whenever necessary anyway.
However, an institution like the MGK which covers all activities of the
state is non-existing in any country of the world," Cicek said.

But Agaoglu did not seem to be convinced. "The MGK Secretariat-General 
has
gone bankrupt, rather than being by-passed. We are going to dissolve it
altogether in three months time," he said when reporters asked him 
whether
the Secretariat was being by-passed.

The bill, as approved by the Justice Committee, brings the following
changes to the structure, duties and authorities of the MGK
Secretariat-General: The secretary general of the MGK will be appointed
after nomination by the prime minister, not by the Cabinet. The 
appointment
will take place after approval from the president. Civilians, too, will 
be
able to be appointed as secretary general of the MGK.

The secretary-general will be responsible solely for the secretariat 
duties
of the MGK.

Three articles of a law on the foundation of the MGK Secretariat General,
which have enabled the
secretariat to have broad responsibilities, will be abolished so that it
will not have any executive power. As for the MGK, it will convene once
every two months, rather than on a monthly basis, to make recommendations
to the government on issues relating to the national security policy.

-----

11) Turkey reform targets army power
BBC
July 30, 2003

The Turkish parliament has voted to approve a seventh package of reforms 
as
part of its preparations for possible membership of the European Union.

The measure was passed by a show of hands with a clear majority.

The reforms are aimed at bringing Turkey's political system
in line with EU norms before its candidacy is assessed at the end of 
2004.

One particular area of focus in this latest package is the political
influence of the military, which is much stronger in Turkey than
other European countries.

The vote comes a day after the Turkish parliament approved a 
controversial bill
granting partial amnesty to Kurdish militants.

The government hopes the Kurdish bill will be a significant
step towards national reconciliation in a country where
tens of thousands of people died during 15 years of conflict.

Radical

Wednesday's reform package is designed to cut back on the
military's powers.

It proposes that the country's military council should meet less
frequently and that its secretary-general have his powers in
government reduced.

The reform proposals also aim to ease restrictions on freedom of
assembly and give a higher priority to human rights abuse cases.

The BBC's Istanbul correspondent, Jonny Dymond, says the
proposals are radical, but critics will watch keenly to see if they
are implemented.

The military's position at the centre of government sits
uncomfortably with Turkey's claim to be a modern democracy, so
the government is cutting back on the military's powers, our
correspondent says.

----

12) Turkish Parliament to Approve Laws Boosting EU Bid
Bloomberg
July 30, 2003

Turkey's parliament may this week adopt laws boosting government control 
of
military spending
and curbing torture by police, as Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan 
steps
up his bid for
European Union entry.

Since lifting the death penalty a year ago, the Ankara parliament, where
the government holds a
two-thirds majority, has made more than 100 legal changes to persuade the
EU to open
membership talks. Army opposition has stalled some measures. Court delays
are hampering
others, slowing efforts to meet EU criteria and hurting the economy,
analysts say.

Turkey has received $31 billion in International Monetary Fund loans 
since
1999. It attracted
about $6 billion in foreign investment in that period, the Organization 
for
Economic Cooperation
and Development says, while Poland, set to join the EU next year and with
half the population,
has drawn $26 billion.

``The EU accession process is 10 times as important as any IMF program,''
said Serhan Cevik,
an economist at Morgan Stanley in London. ``As you have a better
macro-economic outlook,
you will get some foreigners actually building factories.''

The performance of Turkey's $180 billion economy has kept investors away.
While last year's
inflation rate of 30 percent was the lowest in two decades, it is 15 
times
the pace of price growth
in the dozen countries sharing the euro. The undeclared economy may be as
large as the official
one, former Central Bank Governor Gazi Ercel has said, making government
figures unreliable.

Human Rights

Before addressing the Turkish economy, the EU is focusing on 
institutional
changes and human
rights legislation. The 15-member bloc will issue a report on Turkey's
candidacy in October.
Next year, after accepting as many as 10 new members -- mainly from 
eastern
Europe -- it will
decide whether the country is ready to open membership talks.

The measures parliament is scheduled to start debating today will curb 
the
powers of the
National Security Council, which groups top generals and ministers and
takes key policy
decisions. If the law is passed, the council will meet less frequently 
and
elected officials will play
a bigger role.

Other steps will allow political scrutiny of the military budget and 
speed
legal action against
police accused of torturing suspects. The government has said there won't
be any more laws
aimed at meeting EU requirements until the bloc acknowledges Turkey's 
progress.

``Turkey has made progress, and now it's got this far, the EU will need a
good reason if it wants
to backtrack,'' said Bart van der Made, who helps manage $3.5 billion,
including Turkish debt,
at ING Investment Management in The Hague.

Seeking Proof

While the EU may approve the legal changes, it also will seek proof they
are being implemented.
Human rights groups say Turkey needs to improve its record on allowing
freedom of expression
and is still prosecuting writers and political dissidents.

``At least once a week, I'm in some court or other to follow a freedom of
expression case,'' said
Sanar Yurdatapan, a human rights activist. ``The government is at least
trying to make some
things better, but it's meeting resistance in every corner'' from the
military, judiciary and other
officials who fear losing influence, he said.

Turkey may fall short of EU requirements because each time it drafts a
package of laws the
government ``has to concede some very key points to the military and 
other
conservative
circles,'' said Cengiz Aktar, a lecturer in politics at Galatasaray
University. ``Will the government
be able to change the real power of the military? They are pretty alone 
in
this endeavor.''

Military Opposition

Turkey's Chief of General Staff Hilmi Ozkok yesterday outlined military
objections to the draft
law in a meeting with Erdogan, the daily Hurriyet reported today.

Military officers argue that EU-mandated policies will encourage Kurdish
separatism and force
Turkey to soften its stance against Islamic groups. The army describes 
its
role as the guardian of
the country's secular traditions and has frequently clashed with 
Erdogan's
government, which has
religious roots.

Parliament yesterday passed a law reducing sentences for Kurdish rebels 
who
lay down their
weapons and cooperate with authorities. The measure is aimed at ending a
conflict that has killed
about 37,000 people since 1984.

Although it was named a candidate for membership in 1999, Turkey is still
struggling to convince
some in the EU that it belongs in the bloc. Turkish daily newspaper
Hurriyet reported this month
that EU Enlargement Commissioner Guenter Verheugen said the country 
should
never become a
``full member'' of the union. He later denied the comments.

EU Reservations

Valery Giscard d'Estaing, a former French president who led a convention
drafting a new
European constitution, said in a November newspaper interview that 
allowing
Turkey to join
would be the end of the bloc.

Whether or not Turkey joins the EU, modernizing its laws may help to
attract more investment,
analysts said. That in turn would allow it to reduce its national debt, 
one
of the goals of the IMF
program, and ease repayments to the IMF that begin next year, said Altug
Karamenderes, chief
economist at Ata Invest.

That's one reason why the government ``has given its EU program higher
priority than relations
with the IMF,'' Karamenderes said.

Turkey's latest IMF program was aimed at reviving the economy after the
economy contracted
9.5 percent in 2001, the worst slump since World War II.

-----

13) Ankara Moves To Curb Military's Influence, While EU Awaits 
Implementation
RFE/RL
By Jean-Christophe Peuch
July 31, 2003

Eager to start membership talks with the European Union as soon as
possible, Turkey yesterday adopted a series of reforms meant to bring its
legislation further in line with democratic and human rights standards. A
key part of the legal package are provisions pertaining to the role of 
the
military in the country's political life.

Prague -- Turkey's Grand National Assembly passed a landmark legal 
package
yesterday aimed in part at curbing the influence of the country's 
powerful
military on politics.

The reforms, which must be approved by President Ahmet Necdet Sezer 
before
they becomes law, theoretically limit the executive powers and areas of
responsibility of the military-dominated National Security Council (MGK)
and its secretariat. If implemented, the changes may significantly boost
Turkey's changes of joining the European Union.

The MGK, which brings together the president, the prime minister, senior
cabinet ministers, and the army's top generals, has regulated Turkey's
political life since its creation in the early 1960s, shortly after the
military coup that overthrew Prime Minister Adnan Menderes.

The MGK was initially established as a mere advisory body designed to 
help
the prime minister make decisions on security issues. But it gradually
extended its influence over government policy, sometimes turning into
Turkey's main decision-making center.

Critics in Turkey have likened the MGK to the Soviet Union's Politburo 
and
denounce it as a body meant to keep civilian governments under the 
watchful
eye of powerful "pashas," as army generals are commonly referred to in 
Turkey.

The EU has long pressed the Turkish leadership to curb the influence of 
its
military, which has toppled four governments over the past 43 years. The
bloc is set to review Ankara's commitment to democracy and human rights
standards -- known as the Copenhagen criteria -- late next year.

Cristina Gallach, a spokeswoman for EU foreign-policy and security chief
Javier Solana, yesterday welcomed Turkey's decision as very positive,
saying it was going "exactly in the direction of fulfilling the 
Copenhagen
criteria."

In Brussels today, EU Enlargement Commissioner Guenter Verheugen's
spokesman, Eric Mamer, hailed efforts made by the Islamic-rooted Justice
and Development Party (AKP) government to bring Turkey's legislation in
line with European standards:

"The continuation of the reform process shows the strong determination of
the Turkish government to pursue the legislative changes needed to 
achieve
compliance with the Copenhagen political criteria. The reform of the
structure and functioning of the National Security Council is a 
significant
step towards aligning civilian control of the military with practice in 
EU
member states," Mamer said.

But Mamer said the commission will not pass definite judgment on the
reforms until it sees how they are implemented. "In order to benefit all
Turkish citizens in their daily life, the reforms must be implemented
effectively. The commission underlines, in particular, the key role of
executive and judicial bodies at different levels throughout the country 
to
implement the reforms in line with the spirit in which they have been
adopted," he said.

Turkey's Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul yesterday said the government is
determined to implement the new legislation, if only for fear of missing
the EU's boat.

Ankara applied for EU membership in 1987 but was granted candidate-member
status only four years ago. Formal entry talks have been delayed amid
Brussels' concerns over Turkey's poor human rights record. The EU has 
said
membership negotiations could open as soon as 2005 if Ankara demonstrates
its commitment to the Copenhagen criteria by then.

Last year, Turkey abolished the death penalty, and earlier this week (29
July) its legislature voted an amnesty for repentant Kurdish separatists,
another key demand of the EU.

Yet the law excludes the top leadership of the outlawed Kurdistan 
Workers'
Party, which Ankara blames for waging a bloody separatist war in the 
1980s
and 1990s. And representatives of Turkey's 12-million strong Kurdish
minority continue to complain of harassment, torture, disappearances, and
extra-judicial killings.

In a further bid to allay Brussels' concerns, the so-called "seventh EU
harmonization package" approved yesterday abolishes some provisions of
controversial antiterrorism laws that have been curtailing freedom of
thought and expression for two decades. It notably says military courts
will no longer be authorized to try civilians in peacetime and pledges to
promptly investigate and prosecute allegations of police torture.

It also authorizes the teaching of minority languages in schools, 
provided
it does not undermine the "principles and indivisibility of the state."

Addressing parliament after the vote, Justice Minister Cemil Cicek said 
the
changes represent "progress for freedom and democracy" and a "significant
step on Turkey's road to EU membership."

The new legislation says the MGK will meet once six times a year instead 
of
once a month and that its decisions will be non-binding on the civilian
leadership. It also says the MGK secretary-general, who is currently 
chosen
by the army chief of staff among top generals, can from now on be 
selected
by the prime minister from among civilians. In addition, his duties will
remain strictly administrative and will no longer include monitoring the
implementation of government decisions on security issues.

There has been no immediate reaction from the Turkish military. Some army
generals have in recent days expressed concern at the proposed reform,
saying they oppose any changes in the duties and structure of the MGK.

Yet the package voted by parliament yesterday appears to be the result of
compromise between the military and civilian leaderships. Although it
theoretically enables parliament to monitor army spending, the bill also
meets one of the generals' key demands by leaving a certain degree of
secrecy in such procedures. In return, the army's leadership made it 
known
last week that it no longer objects to the MGK secretariat being run by a
civilian.

-----

14) Turkey Curtails Military's Political Power
By adopting reforms, country shows it values eventual place in EU over
national tradition.
By Tracy Wilkinson
Los Angeles Times
July 31, 2003

ANKARA, Turkey - The Turkish parliament took another step in this 
country's
quest to join the
European Union by giving overwhelming approval Wednesday to a landmark
package of reforms
designed to significantly curtail the political power of the military.

On paper, at least, this represents a remarkable move in a country whose
very existence is defined by the army. The modern Turkish republic was
forged by military commanders from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire, and 
the
army has steered most major political developments since.

"To be a general here is to be close to God," said political scientist
Hasan Koni of the University of
Ankara.

"The generals must be having nightmares."

But few things are as important to Turks these days as joining the EU.

Membership, Turks reason, brings economic prosperity, better jobs, 
enhanced
democracy and the
privilege that comes with being recognized as a solidly Western nation.

Turkey hopes to begin negotiations to enter the EU by the end of next 
year,
but to do so it must bring its human rights and political policies closer
in line with European standards.

Military commanders earlier this year registered their unhappiness with 
the
campaign to join the EU and with measures that threatened to erode their
time-honored authority.

The military has overthrown the government four times in the last four
decades, most recently in 1997, when it pressured a pro-Islamic 
government
out of office.

Today, another pro-Islamic government, under the auspices of the Justice
and Development Party elected last fall, is running Turkey. But many
analysts said the army is, above all, pragmatic and has recognized how
broadly popular the notion of joining the EU is.

"We have passed that threshold of the military blocking" Turkey's pursuit
of EU membership, said Murat Sungar, the Turkish diplomat who oversees 
his
country's dealings with the EU.

The most significant measure in the reform package approved Wednesday
involves the National Security Council, a military-controlled 
policymaking
body that shadows the civilian Cabinet.

Its secretary-general - normally a four-star general - is often referred 
to
as a parallel prime minister; his powers equal and sometimes exceed that 
of
civilian ministers.

The reform package strips the National Security Council of executive
authority and reduces it to an advisory body.

It also opens up the military budget to greater parliamentary scrutiny.

And it abolishes some laws curtailing freedom of expression and assembly.

Doubts remain among many Turks, and among their potential future European
partners, on whether Turkey's civilian and military leaders will fully
adopt the changes. Turkish bureaucrats often find ways to circumvent
reforms and maintain the status quo.

"You often find here that it's give with one hand, take away with 
another,"
a European diplomat said.

While some here dismissed Wednesday's military reforms as superficial,
others thought they marked a point of no return for Turkey's efforts to
democratize, to join the West and to require the generals to account for
the billions of dollars they spend annually.

"We have an overstated respect for the military here, and that psychology
might play a role. But with this package, the members of parliament will
have more courage," said Emin Sirin, a member of parliament with the 
ruling
party.

"The military is going to have to explain things," Sirin said. "This is 
not
going to be cosmetic at all."

-----

15) "A revolution, of sorts": Taming the generals, and knocking at 
Europe's
door
The Economist
31 July 2003

ANKARA/ISTANBUL / THIS week Turkey's government, led by Tayyip Erdogan, 
put
two hugely potent bills through parliament. One should dramatically 
weaken
the power of the generals, who, as proclaimed guardians of the country's
secular constitution, have long been accustomed to interfere in politics,
thereby mocking Turkey's claim to be a thorough-going democracy. The 
other
bill offers a qualified amnesty to the rump of a Kurdish guerrilla force
that, until a ceasefire in 1999, was fighting a vicious war in the
country's south-east, which in turn was partly responsible for Turkey's
dreadful record of human-rights abuse. Both bills are the latest striking
signal that the country is determined to revamp its entire system of
governance in order to qualify, some day, for membership of the European 
Union.

But the road towards that goal remains very rocky. A slow realisation 
that
a new world order has emerged since America's invasion of Iraq, together
with the approach of a crunch moment in a year or so in the long campaign
to join the EU, means that the government is still facing one of the
hardest tests since Kemal Ataturk replaced the Ottoman sultans some eight
decades ago with his version of a secular and authoritarian state that 
has
more or less survived until now. But the legacy of Ataturk, the great
moderniser, has itself become a brake on continuing modernisation and 
must
steadily be refashioned or discardeda notion that would have been deemed
sacrilege barely a decade ago. Indeed, it remains a crime to insult his 
name.

Three new challenges stand out. First, to qualify for EU membership, 
Turkey
must still implement a bevy of drastic reforms, including those enacted
this week, entailing changes in its approach to individual rights that 
will
alter the very nature of the bossy Turkish state. Second, linked to that
change, a new relationship between government at the centre and Turkey's
large Kurdish minority may require a redefinition of Turkish identity and
may even lead in the end to an unprecedented measure of devolution, 
though
few people dare to contemplate it yet (see article). Third, the upheavals
next-door in Iraq mean that Turkey must rethink its role as a regional
power broker.

The most immediate foreign-policy question for the government is whether 
to
send Turkish troops into Iraq under American overall commandon the
understanding that they would have to help keep the peace in the south 
and
not in Kurdish northern Iraq where they would be unwelcome. The Turkish
government would much prefer to go in under a UN umbrella. Yet, if that 
is
not (yet) available, it would be loth to turn down the chance to display
its readiness to help Turkey's American allies and to repair relations 
that
were sorely damaged, just before the recent invasion of Iraq, when 
Turkey's
parliament refused to give permission for American troops to use eastern
Turkey as a launch-pad for a second front. In any event, Turks as a whole
have remained strongly opposed to American policy over Iraq and many of 
Mr
Erdogan's Justice and Development Party, as well as the opposition, share
those feelings.

Since the government took office last November, it has on the whole done
quite well, despite some hiccups. A big advantage over its predecessors,
many of which were rancorous and fragile push-me-pull-you coalitions, is
that it has a huge majority in parliament, a good four more years in 
which
to make wrenching economic, human-rights and judicial changes, and an
unusual font of goodwill at home and abroad. But it is inexperienced, 
torn
by conflicting pressures (notably in foreign policy), and already has a
squad of trouble-makers in its ranks. In addition, Turkey's economy, 
though
recovering pluckily from a financial crash two-and-a-half years ago 
thanks
partly to the watchful eyeand massive loansof the IMF, is still very 
frail.
Secret Islamist schemes?

Moreover, the ruling party's Islamist roots, albeit disavowed by its
current leaders, still make many Turks queasy, especially in commercial 
and
liberal-leaning circles in Istanbul, their greatest city. Many still
suspect that Mr Erdogan has a „secret Islamist agenda‰ which he would 
like
to enact once he has consolidated his hold on the state, pushed the
generals into the shade, and got the cover of the European Union for
protection. Such worries make many of the country's generals even
twitchier; indeed, it is not yet certain they will accept the trimming of
their power.

The generals' two biggest bugbears have long been Muslim fundamentalism
(from which Mr Erdogan's party is now so keen to distance itself) and
Kurdish separatism that might, if it grew stronger, prompt the break-up 
of
the once-much-grander Turkish state. Many generals are particularly 
nervous
about the emergence of a Kurdish quasi-state next-door in Iraq and the
dawning realisation of Turkey's own Kurds, probably at least 14m-strong 
in
a total population of nearly 70m, that they may soon be able to enjoy 
much
greater freedom thanks largely to the EU's insistence on minority rights.

This week's clutch of reforms, the seventh in a series of so-called
„harmonisation packages‰ designed to bring Turkey into line with its
would-be EU partners, would, among other things, revamp the powerful
National Security Council, where the generals have predominated, and make
it an entirely advisory body.

The previous government started enacting the EU harmonisation bills, but 
Mr
Erdogan's team has sharply raised the tempo. In parliament's next 
session,
it may even have to amend chunks of the Turkish constitution, still 
largely
inspired by Ataturk and last refashioned at the generals' behest in 1982.
This, too, would mark a seismic change.

The government has already pushed through a string of laws that should 
much
improve prisoners' rightsand make it far less likely, in the first place,
that Turks are prosecuted for crimes of self-expression which have
habitually been deemed by judges to abet terrorism or undermine the 
secular
state. Arguing, for instance, for Kurdish language rights has often been
considered to breach laws forbidding Turks from encouraging the break-up 
of
their state. On that account alone, thousands have, over the years, been
jailed.

The biggest blot on Turkey's human-rights record has been the prevalence 
of
torture in prisons and police stations. Foreign and domestic human-rights
watchers are cautiously hopeful, thanks to a variety of laws included in
the packages already passed, that this dire practice will gradually 
cease.
But the mantra, intoned by politicians, diplomats and human-rights
campaigners alike, is that laws are one thing, implementation quite
another. So far, very few miscreants have actually been brought to book.
Fundamental change on the ground is not yet plainly evident.

Words versus deeds

Indeed, the panoply of repressive laws is so far-reaching and complex 
that
even the best-informed politicians and lawyers find it hard to identify
which laws and articles have been swept away and which could still be
invoked. Moreover, much still depends on the regulatory bodiesthe
broadcasting watchdog, for instanceand the judges and prosecutors who
oversee and interpret the supposed rules.

Again and again, liberal-minded Turks inveigh against the enduring
„mentality of the state‰ and the reluctance of the old guardbureaucratic,
judicial and militaryto respect individual rights, whatever the law may
say. „The culture of impunity [for state organs] and the culture of 
denial
[of past wrongs] is still so strong,‰ sighs a wary western diplomat. Many
ordinary Turks think it doesn't matter much what the law-book says: if 
the
generals and judges are determined, they can still always get round it.
„It's not the rule of law, it's still the law of the ruler,‰ says another
sceptical foreign observer.

Corruption on a colossal scale is the most obvious manifestation of this
age-old abuse of power. It may be the single biggest reason for the
relative failure of Turkey to keep up with countries, such as Spain, that
had a similar per capita GDP half a century ago. Mr Erdogan's party was
elected (with 34% of votes cast, almost twice as many as its nearest 
rival
got) largely because it was thought to be clean. Its ability to govern
alone, along with the prospect that the usual merry-go-round of ruling
coalitions sharing out patronage and spoils has stopped, has raised hopes
that it will stay clean, though some doubts have begun to creep in. The
recent setting up of a parliamentary committee to investigate corruption 
is
a good sign.

Government ministers know that, even if, as is fairly likely, the 
European
Union's monitors issue a laudatory progress report this October, it will 
be
even more crucial to Turkey's chances of joining the club that the array 
of
new laws enacted in the past year is seen to be vigorously implemented in
the ensuing year. The Turks' high hope is that, provided further progress
is plain, a date will be given so that formal negotiations to join the EU
may start at the very end of next year.

How soon after that, realistically speaking, might Turkey actually join?
„Maybe in three, five or eight years,‰ says a minister. The eight years 
of
negotiations that Spain needed is often mentioned. So mark possible entry
down as 2015with a lot of luck. But before that target can be reached, a
sea-change in the national psyche has to take place. Recent changes, at
least on paper, are dramatic. But they are only a start.

------

16) Turkey And The United States: An Alliance Not Yet Beyond Repair
EURASIA INSIGHT
1 August 2003
by Jonathan Feiser

Turkey and the United States share a history of common interests. The
relationship began in 1947 with the Truman Doctrine, which fused national
security with the rudimentary steps that would eventually evolve into the
modern phenomena of globalization. The security apparatus established by
the Truman administration sought more then merely a military umbrella --
although this was the primary objective -- but also spheres of economic 
and
industrial influence. Yet the substantive reason that made such a
relationship possible between the United States and Turkey was the fact
that a plethora of mutual interests existed, not the least of which was a
sense of insecurity caused by the Soviet Union.

Fifty-six years later the balance of need and mutualism may have changed 
by
a measurable degree, but the driving force of national security has
remained essential despite the more superficial and peripheral 
differences
that have arisen since the war in Iraq. Although there was briefly
diplomatic chaos over Ankara‚s prewar stance of not allowing U.S. troops 
on
Turkish soil, Turkey remains an essential element of the stabilization
process that is instrumental to the entire region.

One political handicap, at least at face value, exists within the 
internal
political friction that surrounds Ankara‚s reigning Justice and 
Development
Party (AKP). Controversially, at least in the eyes of many within Europe
and the United States, the AKP supports a platform steeped in Islamic
origins that appeal to Islamists in the region. However, in contrast to
fears at attempts to create an Islamic state, the AKP still retains a
governing paradigm primarily aligned toward the cultural, rather than
political, lines of Islam.

In the meantime, the contention and diplomatic slump that has emerged 
from
the U.S. intervention of Iraq continues to eclipse the formulation of any
constructive regional vision. It is clearly in the national interests of
the United States to stabilize the border regions that surround Iraq. 
Thus
far, the apparent trends concerning both diplomatic inflexibility and
Turkish-United States conceptions of national interest continue to run in
contravention of each other.

Several members of the Turkish parliament have found countervailing
security vulnerabilities in the deployment of Turkish troops to the 
regions
of Iraq. However, in applying such a one-dimensional perspective toward
national security, such members have failed to apply the basic constructs
of geopolitical feasibility: the problem will not go away just because
Turkish troops are not deployed. Additionally, without deploying its
forces, Turkey exacerbates the conflict between the United States while
losing the remainder of its political clout over issues that undoubtedly
involve its national security.

Although the environmental characteristics were different in 1947, the
existence of real threats was clearly visible to both countries then. The
United States forged an alliance with the "Islamic" state of Turkey that
had little to show for itself except for its strategic place on a map. 
The
result, in concert with Greece, was the doctrine of "containment." 
Although
the Soviet Union no longer poses either a global threat to the United
States or a regional threat to Turkey, the destabilization of Iraq is a
very crucial development. In short, the consequences of this current 
theme
will, in one way or another, directly affect the interests of both Turkey
and the United States.

One undercurrent of Turkish alignment that U.S. policymakers and military
leaders must keep in mind is that Iraq is a Turkish border state not
lacking in its fair share of violent history. To pose an analogy
concentrating on national security: what would be America‚s response to a
"regime change" filled with civil violence in Mexico? As America‚s own
history reflects, Washington‚s response was quite involved in Mexico‚s
revolution at the beginning of the 20th century. These are questions 
that,
at least publicly, are not being asked by certain parties that bear a
tremendous responsibility to the developments at hand.

On the positive side, there are key advantages of having the Turkish
military in Iraq. One example is found in the Turkish military repository
of combat experience by regular forces. Turkey‚s military is 
battle-tested
within unconventional warfare environments, such as city streets, due to
protracted conflicts with the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK). In this light,
perhaps Turkish experts could instruct their American counterparts in
developing successful resistance to guerrilla attacks within Iraq.

In both short and long term scenarios, such an operation would possess 
the
potential to heal tensions between the Turkish military and the Kurds, 
but
also contribute to soothing the international discomfort presently at 
issue
with the United States. Conversely, the ethnic tensions that have long
existed between the Turks and the Kurds will make it difficult for such a
relationship to develop. If Turkey were to become militarily involved in
Iraq, it would have to be gradual and under the watchful eye of their
American counterparts in order to avoid a potentially disastrous 
situation.

However, if there is no deployment of Turkish soldiers to Iraq, the 
present
diplomatic freeze could become regionally catastrophic not only on the
issue of Iraq, but globally as Turkey could cease to be in a strong U.S.
orbit. At this point there exists a limited window of confidence sharing
that places a burden of action on the United States. Perhaps it is time 
for
the United States to show its appreciation to Turkey for previous efforts
as well as attempting to understand Ankara‚s plight with simultaneous
ongoing reform efforts demanded by the E.U., all the while as potential
destabilization continues to rage on its southern flank.

In either case, the little steps that both the Americans and the Turks
take, despite the understandable differences of national interests, 
remain
not only tantamount to the future of the region, but also essential to a
new era of confidence.

------

17) Turkish companies win Iraq construction contracts:  minister
AFP
July 31, 2003

ANKARA (AFP) - Turkish businessmen have been awarded 90 million
dollars' worth of contracts in the construction sector in Iraq
in the past month, Turkish state minister for foreign trade Kursat
Tuzmen confirmed.

"I believe we will make serious progress in the reconstruction efforts of
this country," Tuzmen
told a gathering of contractors late Wednesday, the Anatolia news agency
reported Thursday.

A group of 40 Iraqi businessmen would come to Turkey soon for business
meetings, Tuzmen said.

He added that measures were being taken to facilitate movement through 
the
Habur border
crossing with Iraq and that train journeys between the southeastern 
Turkish
city of
Gaziantep and Baghdad would be resumed soon.

Iraq was one of Turkey's principal trading partners before the 1991 Gulf
war, and commerce was
the main source of livelihood for southeastern Turkey, the country's most
under-developed region.

The ensuing UN embargoes hit the local economy, with Turkey estimating 
that
its total
losses since then have reached up to 40 billion dollars (34.78 billion 
euros).

Business has picked up since March following the end of the Iraq war.
International aid
agencies sent their shipments to Iraq via Turkey, creating jobs for 
many --
especially
truck drivers -- in the region.

Turkey is now eager to play a role in the reconstruction of Iraq, 
pushing hard
particularly for a share for its internationally experienced construction
companies.

-----

18) Islam 'should not stop' Turkey joining EU
Financial Times
By Leyla Boulton in Ankara
July 31, 2003

Islam should not be a reason to keep secular Turkey out of the European
Union, the country's minister for religious affairs said as he launched a
scathing attack on the treatment of women in Saudi Arabia, Iran and 
Pakistan.

Mehmet Aydin said the repressive practices in those countries against 
women
represented a misinterpretation of Islam and contrasted them with Turkey,
which is also predominantly Muslim but is implementing political and
economic reforms to boost its level of democracy.

"Neither Pakistan, Iran or Saudi Arabia can be considered religious
states," he said, in fluent English acquired during post-graduate studies
in Britain.

"If you do not have a clear vision of equality among humans, that means 
you
do not have a clear vision of religion. I am ashamed to hear debates [as 
in
Saudi Arabia] about whether women should be able to drive cars. This
belongs to another age."

Revealing that he was about to appoint a woman as deputy mufti (director
for religious affairs) for Istanbul, he said that Islam even in Turkey,
which exercises a strict division between mosque and state, needed 
reform.

This included encouraging women to take up "their right" to pray in any
section of a mosque they pleased rather than being confined to a separate
section.

The minister, who previously taught philosophy of religion at university,
also said that "both sides" were to blame for a long-running dispute over
the wearing of headscarves in Turkey. While arch-secularists saw it as a
symbol of political Islam, ultra-religious Muslims believed it was
essential for women to cover their hair to be religious. "The Koran only
talks about modesty. Whether you need to wear a headscarf is a question 
of
interpretation."

The minister was speaking on Wednesday night just as parliament was
adopting EU-mandated reforms curbing the political influence of the armed
forces, traditionally seen as Turkey's main bulwark against Islamic
fundamentalism.

The ground-breaking changes were passed unanimously in spite of some 
fears
within the arch-secularist elite that the ruling Justice and Development
party (AKP), elected by a landslide in November, was plotting to weaken 
the
military in order to introduce Sharia law to Turkey.

Asked about such fears, Mr Aydin described the AKP, led by former 
Islamist
Recep Tayyip Erdogan, as a broad party "which has its roots in every part
of society. People have nothing to fear. They will have to wait [for 
proof
that the government has no such intention]," he said.

"We have a [reformist] programme which is sincere [but] you cannot change
people's minds overnight, especially those who have a somewhat illiberal
approach to life in general and politics in particular."

Although military commanders have not blocked the reforms, some less
liberal commentators have urged the armed forces to overthrow the 
government.

Mr Aydin, 60, also challenged the view among some EU politicians -
including Valery Giscard d'Estaing, the president of the European
Convention who has claimed that Turkish membership would spell the end of
the EU - that the EU was a preserve of Judeo-Christian culture.

He said Islam was closely related to that heritage and that what counted
most were common democratic values. "What happened to the Judeo-Christian
culture in the second world war when they were all massacring each 
other?"

He also noted that Christian fundamentalists had far less liberal views
than many Muslims. "It is not fair to talk about a monolithic western 
world
or culture. We may know less about Leonardo da Vinci but this should not
obstruct Turkish entry [to the EU]."
Turkey's accelerating progress in meeting EU membership criteria would
further help liberalise the practice of Islam.

"We will benefit from our relationship with EU member countries. The
economy will be in a better position and so will education levels. You
cannot have a healthy religious life if there's an enormous amount of
poverty and unemployment."

But much depended on whether EU states saw "the big picture" and agreed 
in
December 2004 to start accession talks with a country that would become 
the
second largest EU member.

-----


19) Miro Holds Talks on Iraq With Turkish Leaders
Agencies (from Arab News)
July 30, 2003

ANKARA - Syrian Prime Minister Mustapha Miro held talks with Turkish
officials here yesterday over the future of Iraq against a background of
unease over the United States occupation of the country. Miro's two-day
visit - the first by a Syrian prime minister since 1986 - was taking 
place
amid US warnings to NATO ally Turkey to limit its cooperation with Syria,
which is on Washington's list of countries supporting terrorism.

Miro had a working lunch with Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul 
during
which the two sides asserted their common position that Iraq's 
territorial
integrity should be preserved in the wake of the downfall of Saddam
Hussein, diplomatic sources told Anatolia news agency. Turkey's often 
tense
relations with Syria as well as Iran have warmed in the wake of the 
US-led
war in Iraq. The three neighbors share concerns that any move toward
self-rule by the Kurds in northern Iraq could spark unrest among their 
own
Kurdish minorities.

Miro was scheduled to also meet with Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip
Erdogan and President Ahmet Necdet Sezer. In comments to Turkish 
newspapers
on the eve of his visit Miro said that regional countries such as Turkey,
Iran and Syria should strengthen their ties in a bid to resist US efforts
to reshape the Middle East.

"The whole world knows about America's policy to establish a new order in
the Middle East," Miro told the daily Sabah on Monday. "Therefore I think
Turkey, Syria and Iran as well as other countries need to act more and 
more
together because if we stay alone it becomes easier to do what has been
done to Iraq," he was quoted as saying. Boosting bilateral trade and
economic cooperation was also high on Miro's agenda here. The sides were
expected to ink accords on encouraging mutual investment and preventing
double taxation in trade.

Miro's visit marks an impressive improvement in ties between the two
neighbors, which had come to the brink of war in 1998 over Turkish
accusations that Damascus was supporting "terrorists" - Turkish Kurdish
rebels who have waged a 15-year armed campaign for self-rule against 
Ankara.

Tensions eased in October 1998 when Kurdish rebel leader Abdullah Ocalan
left Damascus, his longtime safe haven, and Syria pledged to stop 
harboring
his armed militants. But the flourishing ties between Turkey and Syria 
have
caused unease in Washington. "I think anything that Turkey does with 
Syria
or does with Iran should fit into an overall policy with us, of getting
those countries to change their bad behavior," US Deputy Secretary of
Defense Paul Wolfowitz said in an interview with Turkish television in 
May.

Miro's visit follows Gul's talks in Washington last week, in which Turkey
and the US sought to mend fences following Ankara's failure to back the 
war
in Iraq and persisting tensions over Iraqi Kurdistan. Keen to makeup for
his wartime rebuff, Ankara is considering a US request to send troops to
Iraq to help the United States to stabilize the country.


----

20) ABDULLAH GUL: THE U.S.-TURKISH RELATIONSHIP: PROSPECTS AND PERILS
Washington Institute for Near East Policy
July 30, 2003

On July 25, 2003, Turkish deputy prime minister and foreign
minister Abdullah Gul addressed The Washington Institute's
Special Policy Forum. Dr. Gul was Turkey's prime minister between
November 2002 and March 2003, and he served as minister of state
and government spokesman in the Welfare Party government of 1997.
The following is a rapporteur's summary of Dr. Gul's remarks and
the question-and-answer session that followed. The full text of
his remarks can be found at
www.washingtoninstitute.org/media/speakers/gul072503.htm

TURKEY IS CHANGING

Turkey is going through major reform as a result of its European
Union (EU) accession process. Significant political reforms are
transforming the Turkish political landscape, making the country
more democratic. Another aspect of this change is that since the
Justice and Development Party (AKP) assumed power last year, the
elites are no longer in power, and those outside Turkey therefore
essentially face a new country. Turkey is a more perfect
democracy than before.

*    Political reform and EU accession. The current government in
Turkey is very clear about joining the EU. This is at the top of
its agenda. Turkey will fully satisfy all EU accession rules, the
so-called Copenhagen criteria. The AKP government will act fast
to put the Copenhagen criteria into effect, but it will also be
very cautious in this process. The AKP government will not miss
the EU's 2004 deadline, when Turkey will come up for
consideration to receive an EU accession calendar. No problems
will likely be encountered in this process because the AKP
government has the absolute majority in parliament. These reforms
are not concessions to the EU; the Turkish government will
approve the reforms not only for the EU but for the Turkish
people as well, and that is why they will be passed quickly and
will be enforced afterward.

*    National Security Council. The role of the National Security
Council in Turkey is being reconfigured with the EU reforms,
especially with the seventh EU reform package that the AKP
government is due to legislate soon. This process is taking place
with input from the Turkish military. In the end, the Turkish
political system will be harmonized with the EU accession criteria.

Iraq

*    Reconstruction. A stable Iraq will serve Turkey in many
different aspects, including economics, trade, and tourism. That
is why Turkey wants to contribute to Iraq's reconstruction.
Turkey wants the transformation in Iraq to be successful and
believes that there can be an arrangement whereby the United
States can be responsible for security issues in the region,
while Turkey can help with the logistics. Since the Iraqi war,
the U.S. Department of State and the Turkish Foreign Ministry
have established a high-level mechanism for coordinating
humanitarian supplies to the Iraqi people and logistics supplies
to the coalition forces.

Intentionally or not, Turkey has in recent months been portrayed
as a nation that bargains over what economic benefits it can get
for its stance on Iraq, which is inaccurate. For example, the
economic benefits Turkey might receive in return for sending
troops to Iraq has not been important in Turkey's decisionmaking
process. Turkey can offer humanitarian help in Iraq, such as
providing water, gasoline, and security. Such assistance is
politically important, because in the absence of such basic
necessities, there is a danger that some Iraqis may think their
situation was better before the war. So Turkish humanitarian
assistance could be of considerable utility to the U.S.led
coalition as well as to the Iraqi people.

*    Northern Iraq, Kurds, and the Turkmens. Before the war,
Turkey made a distinction between Iraq and northern Iraq,
reflecting realities on the ground there. Now, Turkey has only an
Iraq policy, not a distinct northern Iraq policy. Turkey believes
that the right decision for all groups in Iraq is to unify under
the new Baghdad regime. Although Turkey encourages the Turkmens
to be good Iraqi citizens, Turkey cannot control this group, for
they are not Turkish citizens. Turkey is interested in the
welfare of the Turkmens as well as the Kurds, who are, after all,
relatives of the Turks.

Turkey is not involved in any secret activities in northern Iraq,
nor does it have any ambitions for that territory. The recent
incident between U.S. and Turkish forces in Sulaymaniyah was very
unfortunate. The United States had been given all the information
about the Turkish Special Forces in the area, but that did not
stop the conflict from occurring. The Sulaymaniyah incident was a
local issue, and the involvement of certain high-level officials
in the talks to solve the incident proved useful for mending the
ties between Turkey and the United States. Turkey hopes that such
a clash will not happen again. Turkish soldiers have fought side
by side with American soldiers many times in history. For
example, last year, Turkey had the responsibility of leading the
international forces in Afghanistan, even staying two months
longer than its agreed-upon period of leadership. Furthermore, it
should be noted that after the United States, Turkey has accrued
the highest number of casualties in UN-sponsored operations
around the world.

*    Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). One of Turkey's major
concerns is the presence in northern Iraq of a large number of
members of the terrorist group Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy
Congress (KADEK), formerly known as PKK. Turkey is planning to
undertake an amnesty law facilitating the return of members of
KADEK from Iraq to Turkey so that they can reintegrate into
society. This action could be an important input toward U.S.
efforts to eliminate terrorism.

Relations with the United States

Turkey's bonds with the United States will thrive because they
are based on common values like democracy, freedom, and a market
economy. Turkey's relationship with the United States and the EU
complement each other. The United States supports Turkey's EU
membership, and this fact can be demonstrated by President Bush's
lobbying for Turkey's admittance to the Union. Turkey has no
reason to expect that the American position on Turkey's EU
accession will change because of the different opinions that
Turkey and the United States have on the Iraq issue. The war on
Iraq has led to varying opinions with other NATO members as well;
such differences are normal in any bilateral relationship.

*    Turkish troops to Iraq? Some months ago, the United States
gave Turkey a questionnaire concerning its capacity to contribute
to the reconstruction of Iraq. Turkey responded to this inquiry,
which was solely about capabilities, not about intentions. The
current trip to Washington represents the first time that Turkey has 
officially
been asked to provide troops. The AKP government needs time to
make a decision on this issue through its democratic processes,
including consultation with the Turkish parliament. Turkey hopes
that its relationship with the United States remains open and
sincere on the troop deployment issue. The two countries should
not try to push each other into a corner. The visit to Turkey
last week of Central Command (CENTCOM) combatant commander
General John Abuzaid will help the two countries decide how best
to work together on these issues. High-level discussions on Iraq
between the AKP government and Secretary of State Colin Powell,
Vice President Dick Cheney, and Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld have been candid. Nonetheless, the AKP government
remains entrenched in democratic principles and therefore Turkey
will maintain its sovereignty vis-a-vis decisionmaking on the Iraq issue.

This Special Policy Forum Report was prepared by Pemra Hazbay, a
Dr. Marcia Robbins Wilf young scholar and research assistant for
The Washington Institute's Turkish Research Program.

----

21) The campaign which gets every section together, continues
Turkish Daily News
August 1, 2003

ISTANBUL - Journalist-writer Abdurrahman Dilipak and musician-human 
rights
defender Sanar Yurdatapan started a campaign called "The Problem of One
Person is the Problem of All People" in order to get victims in every
section together and to find solutions to their problems. The human 
rights
defender, who states that people must leave their own problems and show
interest in the problems of others, thinks that problems can't be solved
unless we listen to each other.

In the framework of the campaign, human right defenders led by Yurdatapan
and Dilipak visited the Association of Oppressed People (MAZLUM DER), the
Human Rights Association (IHD) Istanbul Branch, the Mothers of Peace
Initiative, LAMBDA (Lesbian and Gay Initiative), Beyoglu Journal and the
Foundation of Voluntary Institutions -- Umbrella Organization of 
pro-Islam
NGOs (TGTV), and listen to their problems.

The problems of these organizations is a kind of summary of Turkey's
problems. In the framework of the campaign, the statements of these
organizations follow:

MAZLUM DER: Nineteen people who were tried due to Article 146 of the 
Penal
Code (corporal punishment) for their statements against the head-scarf 
ban
in 1999 , have been sentenced to imprisonment due to the "law for
demonstrations". Among them are Mr. Huda Kaya and his three daughters 
(one
of them was just 17 then) and Mr. Ozkan Hoshanli, president of MAZLUM DER
Malatya branch. Mr. Fatih Colak, who made a radio programme on the same
subject, and Ms. Gulan Intizar Saatcioglu, who participated in the
programme by phone. They were sentenced to two years and 20 days of
imprisonment each.

IHD: Ms. Sevim Yetkiner, President of IHD Mus branch, has been under 
arrest
since July 17. Thirty-eight human rights activists who participated at a
press conference concerning F type-prisons were sentenced to 20 months of
imprisonment each. Ridvan Kizgin, President of IHD Bingol branch, was
threatened with the death penalty. Fifty people were sentenced to
imprisonment because some press material -- none illegal -- was found at
the center. On the other hand, TAYAD members (relatives of the arrested 
and
imprisoned) who were on their way to Ankara to express their demands on
F-Type Prisons, were attacked in Afyon by the fascist "National Movement
Party" members in front of police.

Mothers For Peace: The stated their worries on the -- so called --
"Home-Return Law" is nothing but another "Law of Regret" which will give
worse results than ones tried in the past; while their hope was a 
"General
Political Amnesty" which might bring peace to the country. They also
criticized the acceleration of sending prisoners to F-Type prisons.

LAMBDA: They asked for health and social guarantees. Lambda also asked to
add the phrase "sexual intention" to Article 10 of the Turkish
Constitution, declining all sorts of discrimination. They also demanded
that the phrases "General Morals" and "Dishonourable Crime" etc. should 
not
be used for homosexuals, and they would not be maginalized. Beyoglu 
Journal

The visitors congratulated the new born newspaper and wished their best 
for
the future. Then, they protested the oppression on arts and culture 
within
the last few weeks. The trial against the artists Ferhat TunΩ, Rojin and
Murat Batgi in Dogu Beyazit, the prohibiting of festival posters and
announcements because of having the "X" letter in them; the prohibitions
that were first put and then cancelled for the concerts of Group Yorum,
etc. And finally, they informed the media about the preparations of "SSS
Sanatta Sansure Son" (Initiative to end the censorship in arts).

Foundation of Voluntary Institutions-Umbrella organization of pro-Islam
NGOs (TGTV):
TGTV attended the campaign by giving the following example: Detention 
of a
mother in Bursa, who taught the Qu'ran to her children.


_____________________________

KURDISTAN FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY CONGRESS (KADEK)
POLICY STATEMENT

The Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK) has issued a policy 
statement concerning the political developments in the Middle East, the 
existing informal, unilateral truce with Turkey and the Kurdish 
movement’s political, organisational, military and diplomatic positions. 
The statement sums up the results of a six-day meeting of the 
organisation’s leadership and announces both a process of reform within 
the movement and a fresh drive in the Kurdish freedom struggle.    

As far as the politico-military situation is concerned, the KADEK 
leadership has adopted the position that the downfall of the Iraqi 
regime following the US-led military intervention has triggered off a 
process of all but complete dissolution of the status quo in the Middle 
East. In the face of this process the regional powers-that-be have 
launched efforts to resist this change. The US intervention has not been 
confined to destroying the regime in Iraq, but has gone as far as to 
render questionable the future of the ruling regimes in Turkey, Iran, 
Syria and the other regional states. The conditions for a further 
implementation of the policies defined by each of the regimes that 
uphold the status quo have, to an important degree, vanished. At the 
same time, the existing opposition forces, both in Iraq and in the 
adjoining countries, are gradually losing their influence: In 
particular, those players who cling to traditional ideas of exercising 
power without developing serious programmes for democratisation are left 
disoriented. The example of the KDP is a case in point of how an 
opposition movement holding on to primitive nationalism or radical Islam 
finds itself unable to cope with the unfolding situation. In a situation 
where regimes are confronted with the danger of disintegration and 
opposition forces are disoriented and incapable, an alliance of 
resistance against the US intervention has formed, at the core of which 
stands the coalition between Turkey, Iran and Syria. It is this alliance 
that has encouraged the supporters of the Saddam regime to engage in 
armed resistance. The KADEK leadership therefore holds the view that it 
is the oligarchic regime of Turkey that has embarked upon a multifaceted 
campaign to protect the status quo and jeopardise the intervention by 
uniting the whole continuum of forces opposed to it under its own 
vanguard. In this way, the traditional powers-that-be have adopted as 
their fundamental strategy vis-à-vis the intervention, which they could 
not prevent, an attitude whereby its scope is confined to Iraq and thus 
rendered ineffective.

In the immediate aftermath of its military success, the US threatened 
Iran and Syria, and strongly reproached Turkey.  At the same time it 
took precautions aimed to restrict the influence of the Iraqi 
opposition, notably the KDP and the Shi’ite movement. In the face of 
this assault, Iran displayed a tendency to put up resistance, while 
Syria chose to loyally entrust itself to Turkey. The KDP in turn has 
struck an accord with the Shi’ites, in order to jointly voice their 
discomfort. Turkey, in its turn, has sought to intensify relations with 
the USA, on the one hand, and to take a leading role amongst its 
opponents, on the other. The fact that the USA has failed to secure 
stability in the central region of Iraq has prompted Turkey to intensify 
its efforts to jeopardise the intervention and enforce co-operation on 
its own terms on the USA. In the face of such a fait accompli, the USA 
is uncertain as to the further course of its intervention. The overall 
tendency of future developments therefore remains uncertain. Turkish 
policy-makers are keen on exploiting this uncertainty in terms of 
pushing for the so-called Repentance Bill, which essentially amounts to 
a renewed attack on the Kurdish freedom struggle. The deployment of 
Turkish troops in Iraq is thus seen by the Turkish regime both as a 
means of fighting the Kurdish freedom struggle and a move to regain the 
upper hand as far as regional developments are concerned.

Due to the fact that recent developments also involve an opportunity to 
move beyond the status quo of Middle Eastern affairs – a status quo 
which for the Kurds implied denial of status and perpetual havoc – most 
Kurds have welcomed them. It is against this background that Turkey, 
Iran and Syria have aligned themselves on the issue of cracking down on 
the Kurdish freedom struggle. Turkey especially has stepped up its 
efforts to get the USA to attack KADEK and to create an environment in 
which the policy of this alliance might thrive. This environment not 
only consists of increasing political and military attacks on our 
movement but also of getting the USA involved in an engagement with the 
Kurdish freedom struggle. Although this whole campaign is designed to 
deprive the Kurds of the power to take the initiative, conditions are 
ripe for the progressive forces among the Kurdish people to take the 
lead in determining the further course of developments. We are therefore 
confident that KADEK will be able to provide direction to the flow of 
events by abandoning its current defensive position and intensifying its 
political, organisational, military and diplomatic initiatives. We do 
believe that democratic development is imminent.

The slowing down of the flow of events and the uncertainty following the 
resistance of the defenders of the status quo can only be of a 
transitory nature. No international, regional or even local force would 
be able to continue with a policy shaped according to the old 
conditions. It would be futile to try and perpetuate the same status quo 
that was previously imposed on the region. The present uncertainty will 
make way for new developments, and a fresh drive in our struggle will 
make clearer than ever that democratic unity is the way towards a 
settlement for the Kurdish issue. To the extent that the Kurdish people 
succeed in taking the initiative, democratic development in all 
countries that exercise rule over Kurdistan is almost certain.

The USA will not refrain from trying to restructure the capitalist 
system. The global dominance of a capitalism that relies on 
neo-colonialism has reached an impasse. The oligarchic, autocratic, 
theocratic and monarchic dictatorial regimes of neo-colonialism 
constitute impediments to social development. Capital export to these 
countries is insufficient to render capitalist economy in these 
countries profitable. Globalisation requires that every national 
restriction on the flow of commodities, capital and technology is 
overcome. Social development, on the other hand, requires that societies 
wilfully participate in production processes. All these factors 
establish a correlation between the restructuring process of capitalism 
and democratisation. If capitalism wants to reproduce itself, it will 
have to push for democratisation. Otherwise, the capitalist system will 
share the destiny of the socialist system. It is against this background 
that the Middle Eastern intervention of the USA has the quality of an 
external dynamic of transformation. It will render democratic 
development inevitable – even though this will be done on the basis of 
dependency. To overcome the dominant status quo and put democratic 
development in its place is therefore an urgent necessity of the 
restructuring process of capitalism.

The inexorable process of intervention that thus results from 
capitalism’s desire for change does contain an opportunity for the 
people to establish independent democracies. If they manage to take the 
initiative, these opportunities might well be put in the service of 
democratic civilisation. The Kurds might become a driving force in that 
process, a process that is tantamount to starting a process in the 
course of which a civilisation based on class-divided societies shall be 
replaced by democratic civilisation. The freedom movement for which 
KADEK stands has the potential to install the Kurdish people both as the 
subject and as the object of that process. Having embarked upon a fresh 
drive in the struggle for democratic change and transformation, the 
freedom movement itself will have to undergo substantial changes. The 
outlines of these were discussed at the KADEK extended leadership board 
meeting as follows:

(1) Turkey is engaged in a renewed offensive against the Kurdish freedom 
struggle. This offensive is being waged on a political, military and 
diplomatic level and involves the support of its allies. Turkey and Iran 
are conducting joint military operations against our forces. Along with 
these two countries, Syria has also stepped up its pressure on our 
movement. All three of them are trying to quell the political struggle 
by, among other means, arresting activists. As part and parcel of these 
designs, they are attempting to get the USA to attack KADEK forces. It 
is with this aim that Turkey has passed the Repentance Bill and is 
discussing sending troops to Iraq. This overall offensive has rendered 
obsolete the truce that our movement has unilaterally and patiently 
maintained for over four years patience. A continuation of the truce is 
now only possible if Turkey declares its willingness to formally cease 
hostilities. Unless a bilateral cease-fire is observed, the guerrilla 
forces will no longer commit themselves to the truce. Starting from 1 
September 2003, we will seek to negotiate a bilateral cease-fire over 
the following three months.

(2)     The Repentance Bill that has been passed under the name “Social 
Reintetgration Act” is not a solution to the conflict. The bill’s stated 
purpose is the liquidation of the freedom movement. It was drafted 
without consulting any representative or democratic force of the Kurdish 
and Turkish peoples, ignoring that those who suffered from the war 
should be heard when discussing a settlement. The Turkish government has 
not given up on its designs to destroy the freedom movement; it has 
failed to appreciate a settlement on the basis of democratic unity 
between the communities. KADEK has not received any positive response to 
its calls for dialogue and co-operation towards peace. It is therefore 
inconceivable how the new bill could play a positive part. In the 
interests of our people, KADEK has therefore arrived at the decision to 
reject this bill despite all pressure to the contrary. If the Turkish 
government agrees to enter a dialogue, this bill and related issues 
might be discussed; otherwise it will be nul and void. Our organisation 
is committed, however, to allowing every individual who falls within the 
ambit of the law the freedom of choice to state their preference.

(3) A democratic solution further requires organisational and social 
structures conducive to such an undertaking. This implies that the 
structure and style of leadership will have to democratise and that the 
unconstrained, full participation of activists and grass-roots 
supporters at any level of the struggle be ensured. If a party, 
organisation or body espousing the cause of democracy wants to go beyond 
mere lip-service and adopt democracy as a way of life, it has to open up 
decision-making and implementation processes to as large a variety of 
people as possible. This entails the realisation that the idea of 
absolute leadership involved in Leninist party structures with its rigid 
hierarchy and notion of discipline, the resulting irreplaceability of 
the individual and, most notably, the claim of an absolute vanguard 
position vis-à-vis all parts of society, constitute a contradiction with 
democratic structures. The fact that KADEK has preserved influences of 
the Leninist party model has prevented it from effecting the very 
democratisation it is now talking about. The organisation has so far 
fallen short of implementing democratic thought and discourse in 
practical life. Under the present conditions where a democratic solution 
has matured, there is the need for a serious reform in the field of 
organisational and societal structures in order to prevent a 
self-consumption of the envisaged processes. While the party should 
function as a vehicle for political struggle, it should cease to act as 
the vanguard of democratic organisations and institutions. Each 
democratic structure should in itself function as a lead and participant 
actor in the process of social change. The common efforts of parties, 
democratic organisations and institutions will need to find their 
expression in a Democratic Social Co-ordination on the basis of equal 
participation.

KADEK shall re-evaluate the effects of Leninist theory of organisation 
on its party structures, mode of relationships and way of life and 
subject itself to change on the basis of what is outlined above. It 
shall revisit its program, statutes and way of operating. It shall also 
set up a leadership whose component parts are conducive to this end. It 
shall enrich the fabric of its leadership and its body of members by 
including the Kurdistan National Congress and a variety of other 
democratic circles. Thus a far-reaching politico-organisational reform 
process has been initiated.

(5) The freedom movement, on giving itself a democratic structure, will 
attain the level of providing a solution, when a reform of the 
politico-organisational sphere is complemented by a reform of the social 
plane. Otherwise, the failure to rearrange social affairs will adversely 
affect the politico-organisational structures of our movement just as 
the democratic thought and discourse we cherished were impaired by the 
congealing of our politico-organisational structures and we saw 
ourselves forced to revisit the whole issue. The necessity of social 
reform will make itself felt quite soon; we are therefore intent on 
tackling the issues of social reform correspondent to the structural 
reforms before this occurs.

The criteria prevailing in our movement were shaped by the years we have 
left behind and are therefore in need of revision. As an integral part 
of these, our criteria for crime and punishment will be revisited. The 
participation of individuals in our struggle, their behaviour within the 
struggle and their parting with the struggle shall be evaluated 
according to democratic criteria. Gender relations shall be rearranged 
according to the features of the present stage of the struggle without 
reproducing the backward criteria of traditional society. Taboo 
approaches shall be overcome and relationships shall be arranged in the 
spirit of a unity of form and content that reflects our position on what 
a free human being and a free society should be.

It was further decided at the meeting that a roadmap for a democratic 
solution should be drafted and presented to anyone whom it may concern. 
We are confident that both the struggle drive ‘for a democratic solution 
for the sake of peace’ that is based upon this roadmap, and the outlined 
reform process will not only prompt the freedom movement itself, but 
indeed any group or individual concerned with the issues at stake, to 
undergo a process of renewal. Our movement has once again shown its 
confidence to the effect that the Kurdish people can become a driving 
force in the process of creating democratic civilisation. We draw the 
strength to succeed the revolutionary process that this entails from the 
work and thought of our President Abdullah Ocalan.”

The statement, issued on 7 August 2003, closes by reiterating that it is 
up to the Kurdish people, to the cadres, militants and fighters of the 
KADEK, its supporters and all democrats to turn this move into a 
success. International democratic forces and the world community at last 
are invited to contribute to the success of the project: “Regimes and 
structures that have served their time will become relics of history 
ever faster, and the victory will be that of the forces of democracy”.



8 August 2003
Translation from the Turkish.





Statewatch News online, 12 August 2003
see: http://www.statewatch.org/news

1. Afghanistan: UNHCR imposing compulsory iris-scans on returning 
refugees
over six years old
see: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2003/aug/04afghan.htm

2. German police raid border camp and arrest 250 activists
see: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2003/aug/05border.htm

3. UK: Citizenship ceremony - oath of allegiance to "Queen and Country":
Report
see: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2003/jul/29cele.htm

4. EU: Italian Presidency proposes that officers in plainclothes drive
unmarked police cars across the EU to deport migrants
see: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2003/aug/01cattle.htm

5. The New UK-US Extradition Treaty - removes or restricts key 
protections
for defendants - signed and adopted without any parliamentary scrutiny
see: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2003/jul/25ukus.htm

6. EU: The other asylum statistics - Governments count the numbers coming
in. But who counts the numbers that do not make it?
see: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2003/jul/30irr.htm

also in "News in brief":  http://www.statewatch.org/news/Newsinbrief.htm

7. UK: Hutton Inquiry into the death of David Kelly and WMD website with
transcripts of sessions

8. USA: the surveillance of travel under CAPPS-II. Very good summary of 
the
current situation is on: What's wrong with CAPPS-II

9. USA: Anti-war activists on fly check-list

10. A major debate is opening up on the use of nanotechnology, "Future
technologies, Today's choices" is very interesting report by Alexander 
Huw
Arnail for the Greenpeace Environmental Trust on the implications of
nanotechnology, artificial intelligence and robotics

11. Dutch MEP announces court case on PNR (Passenger Name Record) data
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